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Abstract
This research analyzes the problem of technology transition in the national air trans-
portation system, focusing on the implementation of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B). ADS-B is a key technology in the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration's plan to modernize the national civil air transportation surveillance system.
Data regarding airline perception of benefits, barriers, and knowledge of ADS-B is pre-
sented. Market mechanisms that could potentially cause technology implementation
failure are identified through game theoretic analysis of airline interview data. Poten-
tial market failures identified include public goods failures, cost-benefit asymmetries,
information asymmetries, and risk dominance. Potential institutional failures iden-
tified include organizational process failures and bureaucratic interests and politics.
Government action to correct market failures is explored. Government mechanisms to
correct market failures include technology value, support infrastructure development,
positive incentives, putative measures, and mandates.
Thesis Supervisor: Annalisa L. Weigel
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Objective
This thesis examines the problem of technology adoption in air transportation, focus-
ing on the case of Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B). The goal
is to identify the market mechanisms that might impeded technology implementation
and to explore the potential role of government in correcting those problems. This
thesis also seeks to understand how stakeholders think about the costs and benefits
of ADS-B.
1.2 Motivation
Air traffic demand is increasing, but capacity is constrained by an antiquated air
traffic control (ATC) infrastructure. The number of air traffic passengers in the U.S.
is expected to grow from 738 million in 2005 to 1 billion in 2015. The number of
commercial airline flights is expected to grow from 13 million in 2005 to 15 million in
2015. [22] Figure 1-1 shows the growth in air traffic demand in the United States in
recent years.
ADS-B, a satellite-based surveillance system, offers an opportunity to modernize
the civil air traffic surveillance system. It is a key enabling technology for the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration's (FAA) Next Generation Air Transportation System
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Figure 1-1: Traffic Increase in the NAS [22]
(NextGen). The current ATC system in the U.S. uses radar technology for surveil-
lance.
The FAA hopes that ADS-B will enable new applications and procedures that will
provide benefits in three areas- safety, airspace capacity, and operational efficiency.
Key benefits include:
* Air-to-air surveillance capability.
* Surveillance in remote or inhospitable areas that do not currently have coverage
with radar.
* Real-time traffic and aeronautical information in the cockpit.
* Reduced separation and greater predictability in departure and arrival times.
* Support of common separation standards, both horizontal and vertical, for all
classes of airspace.
* Improved ability of airlines to manage traffic and aircraft fleets.
* Improved ability of air traffic controllers to plan arrivals and departures far in
advance.
* Reduced cost of the infrastructure needed to operate the National Airspace
System.
The FAA's Surveillance and Broadcast Sy:
tasked with implementing ADS-B. [1] The SBS
voluntary early adoption of ADS-B by the airs
also like to ensure successful completion of the -
tion is important because there is the perceptio
in the current air transportation system. The lo
portant to delivering improvements to the natic
on investment.
1.3 Background
tem (SBS) program office has been
program is interested in encouraging
>ace users. The SBS program would
irogram in the long run. Early adop-
1 of a pressing need for improvement
ig term success of the program is im-
aal airspace and for reaping a return
1.3.1 ADS-B
ADS-B technology can be described by consider ng the components of its name. The
system is automatic in that airplanes transmit 1ata periodically, without interroga-
tion. This is different from the radar system, whi h is based on interrogation-response.
The system is dependent in that it receives sig als from similarly equipped ground
stations and aircraft. The surveillance portion 6f the system describes the intended
use of the technology. The broadcast compone it comes from the fact that an air-
plane's message is sent to all receivers in its vic nity, including ground stations and
other equipped aircraft. [1] Broadcast provides the potential for sending air to air
signals, which can enable self-separation. A picture of the ADS-B system is shown in
Figure 1-2.
There are two types of ADS-B functionality, which differ in required equipage
and capability: ADS-B Out and ADS-B In. ADS-B Out is an airplane's ability to
broadcast messages. ADS-B In is the ability of an airplane to receive ADS-B messages
and display the information in the cockpit. ADS-B Out enables applications that
require an air to ground link. ADS-B In enables air to air applications when used
in conjunction with Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI), a method of
displaying the messages received by the airplane in the airplane's cockpit. [2]
I
Global Navigation
Figure 1-2: ADS-B System map [22]
Hardware
ADS-B hardware has both ground and aircraft components. On the airplane, a Mode-
S Extended Squitter (ES) transponder, antenna, global positioning system (GPS), and
a connection to the cockpit are required for ADS-B Out. CDTI would also be needed
to enable ADS-B In on the airplane. The ground component of ADS-B consists of
a ground station for receiving and processing ADS-B Out messages from aircraft.
Ground infrastructure also requires a link between the ground stations and the ATC
automation interface. [2]
1.3.2 Proposed ADS-B Rule in the United States
A notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for ADS-B was issued by the FAA in August
2007. The NPRM proposes to mandate airplane equipage with ADS-B Out by 2020.
Airplanes in the United States will need to equip to technical standards specified in
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RCTA) document D0260A. Accord-
ing to the NPRM, ADS-B ground infrastructure replicating current radar surveillance
coverage in the national air space (NAS) will be installed by 2014. There is a seven
year lag between completion of ground infrastructure deployment and mandated air-
craft equipage to allow general aviation (GA) aircraft enough time to comply.
The U.S. has adopted a dual link standard for ADS-B, meaning that it will use
both 1090 ES and universal access transceiver (UAT) links. 1090ES broadcasts in the
1090MHz frequency and is intended for use by commercial aircraft. UAT broadcasts
on the 978 MHz frequency and is intended for use by GA aircraft. The 1090 link is the
international standard for ADS-B. The FAA chose UAT in addition to 1090 because it
wanted to offer a cheaper avionics package for GA. Furthermore, the extra bandwidth
afforded by UAT can be used to offer airspace information and weather services to GA.
The weather and information services come as part of a technology packaged called
Flight Information Service-Broadcast (FIS-B). FIS-B will be deployed with ADS-B
but is not an ADS-B technology. FIS-B will not be offered on the 1090 link because
airlines already use commercial weather products. To bridge the 1090 and UAT link
frequencies, the FAA will deploy automatic dependent surveillance rebroadcast (ADS-
R), which will retransmit signals sent from one frequency via the second frequency.
Furthermore, during the technology transition to full ADS-B equipage, a technology
called Traffic Information Surveillance-Broadcast (TIS-B) will bridge the radar and
ADS-B transmission frequencies. [2]
Rollout
The four services deployed as part of the ADS-B program are divided into two pack-
ages. The first package is for ADS-B, which consists of ADS-B and ADS-R. The
second package is for data link services, including TIS-B and FIS-B.
The SBS program is also funding implementation of Airport Surface Detection
Equipment Model X (ASDE-X) at major (OEP-35) airports. [25] ASDE-X is a ground
surveillance program designed to improve visibility of airplanes on airport surfaces.
Although TIS-B, FIS-B, and ASDE-X are offered by the SBS program, they are not
ADS-B functionalities.
The SBS program is deploying ADS-B across the nation in two segments. Segment
1 is a trial segment, occurring between 2009 and 2010. In Segment 1, TIS-B and
FIS-B will be deployed throughout the NAS. In addition, ADS-B will be deployed
at several trial sites, including Ft. Meyers, Philadelphia (PHL), Louisville (SDF),
Gulf of Mexico (GoMex), and Ontario (ONT). [4] Ft. Meyers, Florida will receive
information services as part of segment 1. This is part of a test program with Embrey
Riddell's flight school to test these services for GA aircraft. Areas receiving an ADS-B
connection to ATC include Philadelphia and Louisville airports, as well as the Gulf
of Mexico. The Gulf of Mexico project is in collaboration with helicopter operators
in the region and is intended to test ADS-B in non-radar areas. The Louisville
site was selected because United Parcel Service (UPS), a cargo airline, is an early
adopter of ADS-B. It is intended as a demonstration of ADS-B in low traffic density
environments. The Louisville airspace is considered a low density traffic environment
UPS is the dominant operator, with flights primarily at night. Philadelphia will be
used to test ADS-B in high density, or mixed equipage airspace. There will also be an
ADS-B ground station deployed at Ontario, California, another UPS hub. However,
there will not be a connection to ATC at Ontario.
Segment 2 will deploy ADS-B ground stations across the nation. Ground station
deployment will occur between 2010 to 2013, progressing from the East to West
Coasts. A contract for the segment 2 rollout was awarded to ITT in August of 2007.
Applications
The SBS Concept of Operations (Conops) offers a set of applications for the initial
round of applications. [3]
* ATC Surveillance
* Airport Surface Situational Awareness
* Final Approach Runway Occupancy Awareness
* Enhanced Visual Acquisition
* Enhanced Visual Approach
* Cockpit Display of Traffic Information/ Multifunction Display Assisted Visual
Separation
* Merging and Spacing
* In-Trail Procedures and Application in Oceanic Airspace
* Conflict Detection
* Weather and NAS Situational Awareness
Conflict detection and Weather and NAS Situational Awareness benefit GA only.
The Conops notes that conflict detection is not intended to be a traffic collision
avoidance system(TCAS) replacement. Weather and NAS Situational Awareness are
enabled through FIS-B, which is only available on the UAT link.
The ATC surveillance application affects air traffic control applications. Airport
surface situational awareness, final approach runway occupancy awareness, enhanced
visual acquisition, cockpit display of traffic information/ multifunction display as-
sisted visual separation, and enhanced visual approach rely on ADS-B In because
the applications utilize CDTI. Airport surface situational awareness, final approach
runway occupancy awareness, and enhanced visual acquisition uses a cockpit display
to provide situational awareness on the surface, on approach, and in airport airspaces
respectively. Enhanced visual approach uses a cockpit display to continue the use of
visual procedures in marginal conditions, such as haze, fog, ect. [3]
1.3.3 Airplane Equipage in the United States
Current airline equipage in the U.S. can be divided into four categories: not equipped,
latent, latent for ADS-B Out, and latent for CDTI.
Not equipped aircraft lack upgradeable links, Multifunction Displays (MFDs) ca-
pable of ADS-B, and an acceptable GPS. These airplanes are likely to be analog
airplanes. Also in this category are early ARINC 429 data bus airplanes, the first
generation of digital bus airplanes, which might have an flight management system
(FMS) not capable of supporting ADS-B. These aircraft would need new displays and
processors and a link to the FMS.
Latent aircraft have a GPS interface and display, but need a special type certificate
(STC) for an ADS-B link. Generally, needing an STC indicates some level of hardware
modification.
Latent for ADS-B Out aircraft have Mode-S transponders that can be upgraded to
ES and can interface with the existing GPS receiver. Latent aircraft have integrated
avionics, and a modern FMS with integrated functions that interface to electronic
cockpit displays. Upgrading these aircraft for ADS-B Out would require software
upgrades for the central processor and upgrades to certain line replaceable units
(LRUs). For ADS-B In, these aircraft would need recertification of the software with
CDTI.
Latent for CDTI airplanes have a transponder that can be upgraded for ADS-B,
a MFD, and an interface to GPS. To upgrade to ADS-B In, these aircraft would need
recertification of the software for CDTI.
About 5000 aircraft in the United States are equipped with the DO-260 version
of ADS-B. However, some of these aircraft have an unacceptable horizontal protec-
tion limit (HPL) because some avionics manufacturers misinterpreted the DO-260
requirements.
The equipage and latency status of the airplanes do not necessarily correlate with
the cost of equipage. Older airplanes might be easier to equip than newer airplanes.
The integrated electronics of new planes might require recertification of software and
may not be entirely compatible with ADS-B. Both these problems could add to the
time and cost of the upgrade. By comparison, replacing the entire system of an older
airplane may be easier than upgrading a newer plane. [17]
1.3.4 ADS-B Infrastructure in the United States
A legacy infrastructure of data link services (TIS-B and FIS-B) exists on the coasts
of the United States, shown in Figure 1-3. [4] There have also been tests of ADS-B
in Alaska and the Ohio Valley through the Capstone and Safe Flight 21 initiatives,
Figure 1-3: TIS-B and FIS-B Infrastructure[4]
respectively.
The Capstone program in Alaska was used to test and certify ADS-B in non-radar
environments (ADS-B NRA). The Capstone trials showed ADS-B can offer capacity,
efficiency, and safety benefits. [25]
1.4 ADS-B In a Global Context
ADS-B is gaining international momentum. Australia, Europe, Canada, Indonesia,
and China have all begun ADS-B initiatives. Australia has implemented ADS-B in
the Outback. Europe has begun ADS-B trials in several locations through its CAS-
CADE program. The ADS-B initiative with the greatest influence on U.S. domestic
operations is Canada. In particular, NavCanada has mandated ADS-B for operations
over the Hudson Bay, an airspace traversed by many U.S. carriers on trans-continental
routes. [15, 11]
Link Differences
The instantiations of ADS-B in each country differ based upon the structure of the
country's ATC system. Key differences between international and U.S. ADS-B im-
plementations are in the link offered, the ADS-B standard required, and the vision
for a future control paradigm.
Europe, Canada and Australia offer a single 1090 MHz link. Australia's analysis
of costs showed that the 1090 MHz link would not be significantly more costly than
UAT for GA. Furthermore, Airservices Australia does not offer weather services to
GA because of the availability of third party resources, such as XM weather. [7]
In addition, Europe, Canada, and Australia have adopted a D0260 standard for
ADS-B, whereas the U.S. NPRM requires the D0260A standard. The difference
between the D0260 and 260A links is explained in the following section.
A final difference between ADS-B programs in Europe and the United States lies
in the control paradigm vision. While the United States envisions self-separation of
air traffic, Europe sees control of air traffic remaining with ground controllers. It has
been argued that this difference is minor because it pertains to applications at least
twenty years in the future. It is assumed that there will be international collaboration
on ADS-B development to ensure consistency in the global airspace.
D0260 v. D0260A
DO-260 differs from DO-260A in the type of quality message sent.
DO-260 requires quality information to be sent through the Navigational Uncer-
tainty Category (NUC). DO-260A separates the quality information into integrity
and accuracy. Integrity information is sent through the Navigational Integrity Con-
tainment (NIC) and Surveillance Integrity Level (SIL). Accuracy information is sent
through the Navigation Accuracy Category (NAC). Accuracy information is not re-
quired for ADS-B Out if integrity information is known. However, for air-to-air
applications, accuracy information might be necessary. Therefore, DO-260 compliant
aircraft are ADS-B Out capable, but may not be ADS-B In capable.
There has been some controversy about weather DO-260 data is good enough to
use for ADS-B Out. The issue lies in the source of integrity information for the GPS
receiver. GPS receivers output HPL and Horizontal Figure of Merit (HFOM). The
HPL is based on the GPS receiver's ability to detect a bad ranging signal from a
faulty GPS satellite. The HFOM is based on the expected accuracy of the position
data, assuming all satellites are working correctly. DO-260 allows the NUC to be
based upon HPL, or HFOM if HPL is unavailable. However, because HFOM is based
upon the assumption that satellite is working correctly, the user is not protected from
satellite ranging errors. DO-260A requires that the NIC value be based upon HPL.
If the NUC generated by DO-260 is based upon HPL, then it is the same as the
data generated by the NIC in DO-260A. Since DO-260 change 1 requires the NUC
to be based upon HPL, any avionics that comply with DO-260 would be ADS-B
Out compliant. Air Services Australia has worked around the integrity problem by
certifying each airframe for ADS-B operation. [8]
1.5 Stakeholders
There are several major stakeholders for ADS-B in the United States. One stakeholder
group is the airspace users, which include GA, air cargo airlines, regional airlines, and
major domestic carriers. GA encompasses a wide variety of airspace users, ranging
from recreational airplanes to business jets. Air cargo airlines do not carry passengers.
Regionals are airlines that contract flights for the major carriers. Passengers are gen-
erally unfamiliar with the names of the regional airlines. Examples include American
Eagle and Comair. Major domestic carriers are the major passenger airlines that are
fly domestic U.S. routes. Examples would include United and American.
Manufacturers are another stakeholder group. They include airplane manufactur-
ers such as Boeing and Airbus. For the purposes of this thesis, avionics suppliers,
such as Rockwell Collins or Honeywell, will also be classified as manufacturers.
The FAA is also a stakeholder in ADS-B. The FAA plays a unique role in ADS-B
because it functions as both a regulatory body and as a market agent. The FAA reg-
ulatory role is accountable to the public for ensuring the safety of air transportation.
The FAA fulfills its regulatory duties by controlling certification, making rules, and
setting standards. The FAA market agent role comes from it function in ATC. By
providing ATC, the FAA sells benefits and services to the airlines. Furthermore, the
FAA purchases ground equipment from the manufacturers (ITT) in order to operate
ATC.
1.6 Thesis Outline
This thesis will provide an examination of technology adoption problems specific
to ADS-B using a market failure framework. Game theory is used to show where
market failures are likely to occur in airspace user voluntary early equipage of ADS-
B. Focused interviews with airlines provide the data for the game theoretic analysis.
The thesis will also discuss and evaluate potential government actions for correcting
these market failures. Figure 1-4 shows a map of inputs and outputs through the
flow of the thesis. In the thesis map, the dashed lines represent the flow of data while
the solid lines represent process and thought flows.
I Game Theory %
Airline / Analysis
Interview Data / l
/ Policy
Literature Review Anasis Conclusions
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Figure 1-4: Thesis Map
Chapter one motivates the research. It provides background on ADS-B, introduc-
ing the technology and current regulations associated with the technology. There is
also a discussion of international ADS-B efforts.
Chapter two reviews the literature pertaining to the analysis conducted in this
thesis. It reviews work in economics and game theory regarding technology adoption.
It also reviews the applications of theory to problems with characteristics similar
to ADS-B, such as transportation infrastructure problems. The chapter concludes
with an overview of literature regarding government policy from the fields of political
science, economics, and air transportation.
Chapter three lays out the framework for analysis used in this thesis. Market
failure and game theory concepts are introduced. A definition and characterization
of ADS-B used in the analysis is provided. Several games used in later analyses are
set up.
Chapter four introduces the methodology for data collection through focused inter-
views with airlines. Information regarding the number and types of airlines and airline
personnel interviewed is presented. Interview protocol is reviewed. An overview of
the motivation and objective of each portion of the interview is provided. Methods
for distilling the data are discussed.
Chapter five presents the results of the airline interviews. Data from each section
of the interview is presented. Discussion of the results that address specific points
made by individual airlines.
Chapter six analyzes the data presented in chapter five using game theory. Free
market conditions are assumed for all games. Several forms of potential market
failure in the implementation of ADS-B are identified. Sources of market failure are
discussed.
Chapter seven examines the role of government in correcting market failures.
Mechanisms through which government can act are presented. Implementation diffi-
culties are discussed.
Chapter eight provides a summary of the findings and conclusions, contributions
of the thesis, and future work.

Chapter 2
Literature Review
The problem of technology adoption has not been extensively studied in air trans-
portation. Previous technology initiatives have either been mandated by the govern-
ment or entirely market-driven. However, other fields have studied problems with
characteristics that pertain to the ADS-B technology adoption problem. There is
a substantial amount of economics literature on the theory of technology adoption.
This literature presents general theories that can be adapted to a variety of problems.
Particularly relevant to ADS-B is the study of technology adoption with externalities.
More specifically, some economists have studied the effect of uncertainty on technol-
ogy adoption. The economic theory has been applied to multinational transportation
project and risk and security problems.
The role of government in technology adoption has been studied by both economists
and political scientists. There is also literature on the role of government specifically
in air transportation.
Finally, in air transportation, there have been studies of stakeholder views regard-
ing ADS-B. These stakeholder studies have also explored incentivization policies for
technology adoption.
2.1 Technology Adoption and Externalities
Technology adoption behavior has been studied by many economists, particularly in
the context of innovation systems. Of particular relevance to ADS-B is the literature
pertaining to technology adoption with externalities. Reinganum (1981) published a
series of articles using game theory to analyze technology diffusion. In the first article,
technology diffusion is modeled as a two-person non-zero-sum game. She assumes the
firms are in direct competition and that one firm will gain at the expense of the other
if they adopt earlier. Consequently, the analysis found that for identical firms, there
will be a "diffusion" in technology adoption times, with one firm adopting relatively
early and the other adopting relatively late. For non-identical firms, she found that
an asymmetric Nash equilibria will exist. [29] The diffusion model was extended to
multiple firm markets in a second paper. [30] These assumptions do not quite fit the
problem of ADS-B, because the technology is dependent in nature.
Fudenburg and Tirole (1983) also pursued a game theoretic approach to technology
adoption, analyzing the temporal aspect of adoption for multiple player games. They
also assume that the first mover has a competitive advantage over later adopters.
However, in contrast to the diffusion model, they found that when the gain from
preemption is low, firms are likely to adopt later. Furthermore, Fudenburg and Tirole
found that in games with more than two players, the gain from adoption is unlikely
to be symmetric, even for identical players. [13]
An adoption model that matches well with ADS-B is the idea of technology adop-
tion in network industries. Shy (2001) introduces the idea of market failures in net-
work industries, and proposes using game theory to study these failures. Although
Shy presents technology adoption in a network theory framework, his specific analysis
is limited to technology replacement in time. [33]
Reignanum, Fundenburg and Tirole, and Shy all assume perfect information in
their systems, a condition that does not apply for ADS-B. This means that firms un-
derstand the costs and benefits of adoption and all agents have the same information.
As will be shown in the airline surveys, there is a tremendous amount of uncertainty
regarding ADS-B benefits, which is a key factor in the airline's technology adoption
decisions.
2.2 Technology Adoption and Uncertainty
Uncertainty has been factored into technology adoption with externalities models.
Farrell and Saloner (1985) studied how standardization in industry can trap the in-
dustry in an inferior technology under incomplete information. [12] This is partic-
ularly relevant to ADS-B, since surveillance technology is necessarily standardized.
Furthermore, there is incomplete information regarding ADS-B technologies.
The ideas of Farrell and Saloner are refined and formalized for general cases in
the idea of risk dominance, introduced by Harsanyi and Selten (1988). Harsanyi and
Selten show that strategic uncertainty in games with multiple equilibria can lead to
the selection of Pareto inferior solutions. [16] Risk dominance plays an important role
when considering the likely actions of stakeholders in ADS-B. Risk dominance was
shown to be a factor in coordination failures by Straub (1995). [34]
2.3 Applications of Theory
The economic theory of technology adoption has been used to study multinational
transportation projects and a class of problems called interdependent security prob-
lems (IDS).
Multinational transportation projects have many characteristics that parallel the
ADS-B project. Both projects require heavy up-front investment and coordination
of stakeholders with information and cost benefit asymmetries, have government as
a stakeholder, and exhibit network externalities.
The network characteristics of transportation systems were characterized by Laird,
Nellthrop, and Mackie (2005). [19] An analysis of multinational transport projects in
Latin America was conducted by Caracamo-Diaz and Goddard (2007). They conduct
a game theoretic analysis of market failures under different information and cost-
benefit asymmetry conditions. They also investigated the role of government and
the impact of government on system risk and benefit. [6] Fujimura (2004) conducted
case studies of multinational infrastructure projects in Asia, showing the risks and
coordination difficulties involved in these projects. [14]
Kunreuther and Heal (2003) used game theoretic techniques to examine how com-
panies invest in protection from risk in a system with network dependencies. They
incorporated probabilistic models of risk into the games, creating a method for ana-
lyzing IDS problems. This model contrasts with work done in transportation, which
separates market effects from system risk. Kunreuther and Heal also investigated
potential government policies by examining mechanisms through which governments
can correct identified failures. [18]
2.4 Government Policies
Government policies have been studied in a number of disciplines. The field of welfare
economics has studied stakeholder incentivization extensively. In welfare economics,
the role of government is to correct market inefficiencies. However, the theory of
welfare economics has somewhat limited application to ADS-B because it assumes a
perfectly competitive market.
Government policies for technology adoption with network effects and public goods
characteristics were studied by Dybvig and Spatt (1983). They described two types
of public goods problems- early adopters and late adopters. Furthermore, they inves-
tigated the ability of government mandates and anonymous subsidies to push markets
to Pareto-optimal equilibria. They found that mandates can be effective because they
offer insurance to early adopters. Furthermore, they found that anonymous subsidies
can be effective in encouraging technology adoption, but it may incentivize the wrong
players to adopt. [9] The proof offered by Dybvig and Spatt is valuable because
it offers insight into a counterintuitive phenomenon observed in practice. However,
the analysis of government actions does not encompass all possible scenarios for air
transportation technology adoption.
From a policy perspective, Sandler (2001) investigates the role of international or-
ganizations in encouraging adoption of international public goods. Sandler provides
a taxonomy of types of public goods, noting that all goods have different amounts of
public and private good characteristics. Government actions are proposed in accor-
dance with taxonomic classification of the good. In particular, Sandler notes that for
governments to achieve desired public goods benefits, the private goods characteris-
tics of the good can be leveraged to induce stakeholders to adopt. [32] This idea is
particularly interesting and applicable to ADS-B, which is a good with both private
and public goods characteristics.
In the field of air transportation, Marais and Weigel (2006) have studied the role
of government in air transportation infrastructure projects. They propose charac-
terizing projects by stakeholder costs and benefits and deploying government action
accordingly. They also provide a framework within which to study potential govern-
ment actions for air transportation projects. [21] This thesis uses the government
action framework of Marais and Weigel to study potential government policies for
ADS-B.
2.5 ADS-B Stakeholder Studies for the Domestic
U.S.
For ADS-B in the domestic United States, stakeholder views have been expressed by
industry bodies representing airspace user groups. For example, the Air Transport
Association (ATA), which represents the major domestic airlines, has published sev-
eral opinion pieces that speak for the airline perspective on ADS-B. A key piece of
literature is the ATA response to the NPRM for ADS-B Out, which summarizes the
airline industry position regarding ADS-B. [5] The Aircraft Owner and Pilots Associ-
ation (AOPA) has also written opinion pieces regarding the GA view of ADS-B costs
and benefits. [27] In addition, it is likely that AOPA has submitted to a response to
the NPRM for ADS-B Out, but it has not been published. Because both the ATA
and AOPA represent industry groups, neutral party studies would be valuable in val-
idating their conclusions and in helping frame their positions within a system-level
view.
Lester (2007) has studied stakeholder opinions as a neutral observer. He examined
stakeholder views ADS-B from an individual pilot perspective, with an emphasis on
general aviation issues. Lester has also explored potential government policies based
upon the results of the study. [20] However, because individual pilots do not represent
the views of an airline, it is necessary to conduct a study of airline views of ADS-B.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter presented a review of key literature pertaining to technology adoption
and stakeholder views of ADS-B. The ideas presented can be applied to air trans-
portation, studying problems of technology adoption, such as ADS-B. This thesis will
use the market failure framework and game theoretic analysis technique introduced
by Shy. Other works introduced in this chapter will inform the analysis of the games
and help in interpreting the results. For policy analysis, the thesis will use the frame-
work established by Marais and Weigel. The data presented in this thesis will offer a
neutral observer reporting of airline views regarding technology adoption, with par-
ticular emphasis on ADS-B. The analysis presented in this thesis will serve to bridge
the theory of technology adoption with the practice of air transportation technology
implementation.
Chapter 3
Market Failures Framework
A market failure framework is used to study potential problems in adoption of ADS-
B under free market conditions. The free market conditions represent the dynamics
of ADS-B equipage without government intervention. This would be the case of
voluntary early equipage by the airlines. The proposed mandate and other potential
government actions will be evaluated in Chapter seven (Policies) of this thesis for
their ability to correct problems identified by the market failure analysis.
ADS-B is a special type of market known as a network market. The network
characteristics of ADS-B make it prone to market failure. Game theory can be used to
illustrate market failures. Data for the game theory analyses were collected through
stakeholder interviews, which are detailed in Chapters four and five of this thesis.
Data from general aviation users was collected in a previous thesis by Lester. [20]
Government intervention may be effective in correcting market failures. Policy
actions are suggested using a framework outlined by Marais and Weigel. [21]
3.1 Market Characterization of ADS-B
An economic market is defined as a social structure that facilitates the exchange of
goods. The air transportation system has many markets. The characteristics of the
markets vary with the nature of the technology and stakeholder interactions. ADS-B
comprises a unique market within the air transportation system.
The ADS-B market good is the engineering system. It includes the ADS-B tech-
nology, as well as the services and benefits derived from the technology. Stakeholders
in the ADS-B system include airspace users, the FAA/ATC, and the manufactur-
ers/service providers. Airspace users include major airlines, regionals airlines, cargo,
business jets, GA, ect. In the market, the role of the FAA/ATC is distinct from its
role as a regulatory body. In essence, the FAA should be considered as two separate
entities- a regulatory entity and a market agent. Figure 3-1 shows a schematic of the
ADS-B market system.
Figure 3-1: ADS-B Economic System
Airspace users are buyers in the market; manufacturers are sellers. The FAA
functions as both a seller and a buyer. Airspace users buy avionics (airplanes) from
manufacturers and services and benefits from the FAA. The FAA buys technology
capability from the manufacturers so that they may sell the services to the airlines.
Network Market Traits
The main attributes of a network market are: 1) complementarity, compatibility,
and standards; 2) consumption externalities; 3) switching costs and lock-in; and 4)
significant economics of scale in production. [33] ADS-B exhibits all four of these
characteristics.
Complementarity, compatibility, and standards mean that goods come as a system
rather than as individual components. A classic example is the CD player, which
would be useless to consumers without CDs. Likewise, ADS-B is a system product.
The avionics, ground stations, and ATC displays must all be coordinated. In addition,
ADS-B needs procedures and applications to deliver benefits.
Consumption externalities refer to the phenomenon where the utility derived from
a good is affected by the number of others using similar or compatible products.
A commonly cited example is the telephone. A telephone's value to an individual
increases as the network of users with compatible technologies increases. Likewise,
due to the dependent nature of the technology, the value of ADS-B increases as more
people equip. For example, having more airplanes equipped with ADS-B would enable
procedures that allow for closer separation, thereby increasing airspace capacity or
reducing delays. This would benefit both airspace users and the FAA. Furthermore,
having more airplanes equipped would benefit airplane manufacturers because they
would be able to manufacture more units, thereby employing economies of scale in
production.
Lock-in occurs when the cost of switching to a new technology is high. There
can be many types of switching costs, including training and learning time, data
conversion, search cost, loyalty cost, and contracts. [33] For ADS-B, aircraft equipage
is likely to impose a large switching cost on the airspace users. Aircraft owners must
pay for avionics, which can be expensive. In addition, commercial carriers face added
costs from lost revenue due out of service time and pilot retraining. The FAA must
invest money in ground stations, applications development, and retraining air traffic
controllers. Airplane manufacturers also incur switching costs by having to modify
avionics production.
Economics of scale in production occur when the cost of manufacturing a product
decreases as the number of units produced increases. Presumably, as more aircraft
equip with ADS-B, the cost of the avionics will decrease. This can be attributed to
the fact that manufacturers will be able to distribute their technology development
and certification costs over a larger number of users. Also, presumably, the cost of
ATC services might decrease as more users equip and controllers reap operational
efficiency and situational awareness benefits.
3.1.1 Nature of ADS-B goods
The ADS-B engineering system has both public and private good characteristics. A
public good is defined as being non-rival and non-exclusive. [32] This means that
if one person purchases a good, the good will be available to all other users in the
system as well.
Some benefits that come from ADS-B are private in nature. Examples would
include potential fuel, efficiency, and cost savings for the airlines. For ATC, the
private benefit would be a reduction in operating costs, since ADS-B is cheaper than
radar.
ADS-B benefits also have public good characteristics, which arise from the network
structure of the market. The externalities created by ADS-B equipage are examples of
public goods. Increased safety and improved situational awareness can be considered
public benefits because if only one user equips, all other users will also reap benefits.
Furthermore, safety benefits are difficult to quantify and often do not factor into a
company's business case. Some efficiency improvements are also public benefits. If
one airline equips, non-equipped aircraft using sharing an operating environment (e.g.
airports or airspace) will also reap efficiency benefit.
3.2 Market Failures Overview
Market failures are likely to arise in network markets with products with public good
characteristics. By definition, a market failure is an inefficient allocation of resources.
For ADS-B, a market failure can be defined as a case where users choose not to equip.
There are several sources of market failure. These include abuse of market power,
externalities, public goods, and asymmetric information or uncertainty. Abuse of
market power encompasses imperfect competition scenarios, such as monopolies and
ogliopolies. In situations where a firm dominates the market, they may use their
power to achieve certain market situations that are not optimal. Externalities refer
to benefits produced by one market agent that may benefit other market agents. A
public goods market failure occurs when system-wide benefits justify purchase of the
good, but individual benefits are too diffuse for any one agent in the market to jus-
tify purchase of the good. Asymmetric information occurs when some information
regarding the market is available to certain users but not to others. Having asym-
metric information means that different users will not always act in accordance with
rational choice theory. Uncertainty is when risk is added to the market and users
have a probability distribution associated with their actions as opposed to a one or
zero probability of making a particular choice. [10]
3.3 Institutional Failures Overview
Institutional failures are analogous to market failures. Institutional failures occur
when government intervention in a market leads to inefficient allocation of resources.
An example would be when the government regulates a less efficient technology stan-
dard.
Examples of institutional failures include bureaucratic interests and politics and
organizational process failures. Bureaucratic interests and politics is an organizational
interest in wealth and power. It can potentially lead to a lock-in to the existing
distribution of rewards. Organizational process failures occur when the government's
standard operating procedures do not fit into nonstandard or evolving situations. The
government may fail to change their standard operating procedures to accommodate
new situations. [28]
3.4 Game Theoretic Analysis Overview
Game theory is used to evaluate the existence of market and institutional failures in
ADS-B.
Although there is an NPRM for ADS-B, free market conditions are assumed in
the game theoretic analysis. Free market conditions model a situation where airspace
users voluntarily equip. This assumption will allow for an objective assessment of all
possible government intervention actions.
Under the free market assumption, several games can be played. Game situations
arise at stakeholder coordination points. Therefore, there are games between 1) major
domestic carriers; 2) major domestic carriers and other airspace users; 3) the FAA
and airlines; and 4) airlines and the manufacturers. This thesis will analyze the first
three interactions listed because the data collected pertains most to those games. In
addition, game four is similar to game two.
The first game, between major domestic carriers, is an n-player game. A unique
trait of n-player games is the ability to form coalitions through side payments, com-
munication, and bargaining. Assume airlines are not allowed to form coalitions or
collude because this would violate anti-trust laws. Furthermore, assume airlines make
equipage decisions independently. The assumptions simplify the n-player game such
that it can be represented as a 2x2 game. [26]
The game between major domestic carriers and other airspace users assumes that
each airspace user group acts as a coalition. The 'other airspace users' coalition
includes GA, regionals, and other smaller air carriers. Although the users in the 'other
airspace users' coalition are quite diverse, they have similarities in their structure
that make them a cohesive coalition for game theoretic analysis. In particular, other
airspace users often do not have the resources to invest in new technologies proposed
by the FAA, making them a group of relatively late adopters. Furthermore, the
other airspace user group has a different set of benefits objectives than the major
carriers. For this game, asymmetry of costs and benefits and asymmetric information
are modeled.
The majors to FAA game is also asymmetric in costs and benefits. Furthermore,
a dynamic game will be played between the majors and the FAA, simulating possible
multiple steps to ADS-B equipage.
3.4.1 Static Games
All of the static games analyzed are 2x2 games that can be expressed as a normal
form game. Figure 3-2 shows the 2x2 game setup.
Each user has two decisions, equip or don't equip (invest or don't invest). One
Equip
Top Player (B)
Don't Equip
Figure 3-2: 2x2 Normal Form Game
player's decisions are shown across the top and the other player's decisions are shown
along the side. Player payoffs are shown inside the squares. For purposes of clarity,
payoffs for the side player (rows) will be shown in the top left hand corner of each
square. Payoffs for the top player (columns) will be shown in the bottom right hand
corner of each square.
3.4.2 Extensive Form Games
Extensive form games are used to analyze multiple-step decision making. Figure 3-3
shows an extensive form game.
Player A
Phl
Ac
er B
n2
(all, bil) (a12, b12) (a21, b21) (a22, b22)
Figure 3-3: Extensive Form Game Structure
The game is formulated in a tree structure, with each node representing a decision
all a12
bli b12
a21 a22
b21 b22
point for the players. The branches of the tree represent the decisions available to
the players. At each node, one player makes a decision. For the game in Figure 3-3,
Player A makes the first decision and Player B makes the second decision. Payoffs
are shown at the terminus of the tree. The branches of the tree may have associated
probabilities to model the likelihood that a player will choose a particular action.
The tree will have branches with probabilities when players make decisions based on
factors other than simple payoffs. An example of another factor is risk.
3.4.3 Equilibrium Concepts
For every game, there can be a set of feasible steady-state solutions, or equilibria. The
three equilibrium ideas used in this thesis are Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimality,
and risk dominance.
A solution is a Nash equilibrium if no player can benefit by unilaterally changing
their strategy while the other player keeps their strategy the same. Nash equilibria
suggest that there exist solutions that will tend to attract players.
In games with multiple Nash equilibria, the equilibria can be Pareto ranked.
Pareto optimality is the situation where no agent's position can be improved without
making another agent worse off. [10] By definition, a Pareto optimal solution is also a
Nash equilibria, although the converse is not true. For the case of ADS-B, the Pareto
optimal Nash equilibria can be defined as (equip, equip).
Risk dominance models player behavior under uncertainty. The risk associated
with choosing a particular strategy is the cost to one player if they unilaterally deviate
from that strategy. [16] If an equilibrium is Pareto optimal but risk dominant, players
are not likely to select it. Intuitively, the strategy for which a player seeks to lose
more in the face of payoff uncertainty is considered risk dominant. Therefore, the
probability of a player choosing a particular strategy is not only influenced by pure
payoff, but also by the amount of strategic uncertainty in the system. For a 2x2
game, the risk of a solution is its Nash product. The equilibrium with the higher
Nash product dominates. [34]
3.4.4 Equilibrium Concept Example
To illustrate these equilibrium concepts, consider the game in Figure 3-2. Assume
a12 = a21 and b12 = b21. Assume a coordination game, so the following conditions
hold:
all > a12  (3.1)
all > a22  (3.2)
Analogous conditions hold for Player B.
Then, the game has two Nash equilibria: (all, b11) and (a22, b22), the solution in
the upper left and bottom right corners. Because of the condition in equation (3.2),
(a11 , b11) is the Pareto dominant solution.
The Nash product of the (a11, b11) solution is: (all - a21) " (bll - b12)
The Nash product of the (a22, b22 ) solution is: (a22 - a 12 ) (b22 - b21)
The Pareto inferior solution, (a22 , b22), would risk dominate if it has a higher Nash
product. So, if (a22 - a12) - (b22 - b21) > (all - a21) - (bll - b12), the Pareto inferior
solution risk dominates.
3.5 Conclusion
The ADS-B technology adoption problem is formulated as a network market system.
The stakeholders in the ADS-B market are defined to be airspace users, manufactur-
ers, and the FAA. The good in the market is defined to be the ADS-B engineering
system.
The network characteristics of ADS-B make it prone to market failures. Several
types of market and institutional failures are described. Game theory is introduced as
a tool for examining market failures. Two types of games are presented- a static game
in normal form and a dynamic game in extensive form. In addition, the game theoretic
equilibrium concepts of Nash Equilibria, Pareto Optimality, and Risk Dominance are
introduced. The situation where all airspace users equip with ADS-B is defined as
the market efficient, or Pareto Optimal, situation.

Chapter 4
Airline Interview Methodology
Airlines were interviewed to collect data for the game theoretic analysis of market fail-
ures. Airline interviews provide insight into how one stakeholder group thinks about
ADS-B. This chapters outlines the method used for conducting airline interviews and
analyzing the data.
4.1 Interview Participants
Airlines surveyed included domestic national carriers, regional airlines, cargo airlines,
and business jet share programs. A total of fourteen airlines were interviewed. A
distribution of interview participants by airline type is shown below in Figure 4-1.
Airline type was determined by self-reported affiliation. In general, domestic national
carriers are those that belong to the Air Transport Association, regional carriers
belong to the Regional Airline Association, and general aviation are represented by
the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association.
Airlines asked to participate are those with the largest number of daily operations
according to ETMS data from 2003. Additionally, airlines that have significantly
expanded their operations since 2003 were interviewed.
Of the ten domestic national airlines asked to participate in the interview, eight
responded, one chose to use the official Air Transport Association (ATA) response to
the NPRM as a proxy for their views, and one chose to speak off the record. The data
for the off the record interview is not presented, although the contextual information
they provided did inform thinking in the analysis of results. Of the nine regional
airlines invited to participate in the interview, three responded. All of the cargo
carriers invited to participate in the interview responded. There was some difficulty
finding contacts at the business jet programs, but one of the four major business jet
share programs was interviewed.
Airlines Interviewed
Figure 4-1: Airlines Interviewed
The interview participants were airline personnel familiar with ADS-B, either
through operations or engineering (avionics). Interviewees included operations direc-
tors, avionics managers, flight technical pilots, and ATC liaisons for airlines. Some
airline interviews were conducted with only one employee, while in other interviews,
several employees were present.
4.2 Interview Method
Focused interviews were conducted via telephone with airline personnel. Answers were
recorded on tape and by typing on a computer. In some cases, the taping mechanism
did not work so only typed notes exist. Some interviewees prepared written responses
in addition to their phone interview responses. These were collected by the interviewer
via e-mail. The interview questions were sent to the participants for review at least
one day before the interview.
Interviews were conducted between December 2007 and February 2008. Inter-
views usually lasted between one and two hours. The MIT Committee On the Use
of Human Experimental Subjects (COUHES) protocol was followed for interviews.
Several interview participants chose to keep their name and their airline name anony-
mous. Several other interviewees asked for permission to use quotations. Because
a small pool of interview participants makes it easy to identify airlines if some data
were attributed and others were not, all results are presented anonymously.
4.3 Interview Questions
The interview protocol covered general perceptions of ADS-B, ADS-B benefits, costs
and barriers to equipage, current fleet status, equipage plans, and synthesis. A short
overview of ADS-B was provided in the interview protocol introduction. A copy of
the survey can be found in Appendix A of this thesis.
The background section was used to gage an interviewee's level of familiarity with
ADS-B. It then probed for perceptions of the technology and the NPRM.
The benefits portion asked about potential benefits and benefit locations of ADS-
B. In addition, it asked interviewees to judge the value of the benefits. A standard
set of benefits was not given to interview participants. To ensure completeness in
answers, the interview protocol provided a framework for thinking about possible
benefit areas. The framework asked interviewees to think about benefits by flight
regime (terminal, enroute, non-radar area, surface) and, within each flight regime,
by function (ATC, AOC, cockpit). The benefits section also asked about the utility
of services offered only on the UAT link and the impact of network effects on airline
equipage decisions.
The costs and barriers portion of the survey asked about costs and barriers to
ADS-B equipage. It specifically addressed upgrade costs and asked about airline
confidence in the FAA. The costs and barriers portion also asked about incentives for
encouraging adoption.
Current status questions were asked to gain a better understanding of how airlines
use their fleets and to assess the current state of airline equipage.
The future technologies section asks about planned ADS-B In equipage and non-
ADS-B technologies in which airlines might be investing. The purpose of the future
technologies section is to understand other equipment airlines will have in the near
future, competing constraints on airline budgets, and what technologies ADS-B will
compete with in providing benefits. In addition, asking about future technologies
gives insight into the criteria airlines use to make equipage decisions and how they
value technology benefits.
At the end of the interview, airlines were given the opportunity to synthesize their
views provide suggestions regarding the administration of the SBS program.
4.4 Analysis of Interview Data
Several methods were used to parse the airline interview data. The method used
depended on how the questions were posed. Some questions had uniform answers
that were distinctly categorizable For example, airline equipage and future technology
investment questions yielded statistics or a finite set of discrete answers.
Responses to benefits and barriers questions were distilled using content analysis,
which looked at the frequency and intensity of responses. General categories were
designated to encompass more specific answers. These categories were determined
based upon accepted standards in air transportation. In general, the categories are
distinct in geography or phase of flight. For example, continuous descent arrivals
(CDAs) and closely spaced parallel approaches fall into the broader category of arrival
and departure procedures.
4.5 Conclusions
The methodology for airline interviews was presented. An overview of airlines and
type of airline personnel interviewed is given. The interview protocol is introduced.
The method for analyzing interview data is reviewed.

Chapter 5
Interview Results
The following chapter presents results of the airline interviews described in the Chap-
ter four (Airline Interview Methodology) of this thesis. The sections in this chapter
correspond to sections of questions asked in the airline interview.
The location of this chapter relative to the overall objective of this thesis is shown
in Figure 5-1. The data presented in this chapter will be used in the game theory
and policy analysis of later chapters.
5.1 Airline Perception of ADS-B
Airlines are supportive of the ADS-B concept because they view it as a necessary
tool for modernizing the national air transportation system. The airlines have been
impacted by increased congestion in the NAS through delays and are concerned about
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Figure 5-1: Thesis Map
increasing fuel costs. There is consensus amongst airlines that the air transportation
system must be improved. International ADS-B programs lend further credence to
the domestic technology initiative. However, some airlines are skeptical about the
future success of the ADS-B program because of residual displeasure with past FAA
technology implementation programs.
There is significant variation in the level of airline knowledge about ADS-B. Some
airlines have employees closely involved with technical and procedures standards de-
velopment, sitting on FAA and RTCA committees. For other airlines, knowledge of
ADS-B is limited to press releases provided by the FAA. The range of familiarity with
ADS-B led to a wide variety of answers regarding ADS-B benefits and equipage.
5.2 Benefits
Airlines are interested in benefits that will justify a business case for equipage. Airlines
identified a variety of factors that contribute to a positive business case. Variation in
responses aligned with differences in operations. Major airlines and cargo operators
cite fuel savings, capacity increases, and overall operation efficiency as key factors to a
positive benefits case. Regional airlines garner indirect benefits from fuel and capacity
increases, since the majors pay for the fuel and set the schedule. However, more
efficient operations would benefit the regionals by making them more competitive
in bidding for contracts. Business jet owners are primarily interested in safety and
efficiency benefits. Although all operators are concerned about safety, safety benefits
alone are not sufficient to justify a business case for equipage.
There were a wide variety of benefits answers due to the diversity of knowledge
and optimism among respondents. Some respondents based their answers on the
applications listed in the SBS Conops. Others based their answers on the long term
vision for ADS-B. Some respondents also constrained their answers to applications
that they felt could be realistically accomplished by the FAA.
Despite differences in factors that contribute to a positive business case, there is
agreement on the types of applications and procedures that would provide benefits to
airlines. Operational differences seemed to modulate the intensity of some preferences.
Applications cited as beneficial by the airlines can be divided into two categories-
high benefits and lower benefits. High benefits have a large direct impact on the
company bottom line. Lower benefits might have an indirect or smaller magnitude
impact on the company bottom line. High benefit applications tend to be in the
early stages of development and require capabilities that have not yet been devel-
oped. Lower benefit applications tend to be available for immediate use. Often, these
applications use technology or procedures that are already in place. Figure 5-2 shows
the beneficial applications cited by airlines.
Figure 5-2: Benefits Applications
5.2.1 Primary Benefits
Reduced Separation Standards
All of the airlines mentioned reduced separation standards as the highest benefit ap-
plication. Reduced separation standards would decrease queuing delays, reducing fuel
costs. Theoretically, system capacity would increase as well. There is disagreement
about whether reduced separation standards are achievable and there are many ideas
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about how to achieve separation standards. Some airlines believe that ADS-B Out
alone will enable reduced separation standards. Other airlines believe that reduced
separation standards will only come with ADS-B In and procedures development, so
the benefit will be realized in the long term.
Some airlines believe reduced separation can be achieved with just ADS-B Out
because ADS-B offers higher fidelity data than radar. Since it is a GPS-based system,
ADS-B can offer a faster update rate and greater accuracy and integrity than radar.
Some airlines believe that reducing error in the data will result in decreased actual
airplane separation, leading to airspace capacity increases. Other airlines believe that
better accuracy will provide sufficient justification for lowering separation standards.
However, many airlines are skeptical that ADS-B Out can satisfy the requirements
needed to reduced separation standards. Airlines expressed concern that the FAA's
certification mechanisms will not be able to approve the reduced separation standards
because they do not have precedent for such actions and are not equipped to make
them.
Several airlines suggested that reduced separation standards might be achievable
with ADS-B In. One idea is that ADS-B In will enable visual flight rule (VFR)
procedures in instrument flight rule (IFR) conditions. This will require CDTI to aid
the pilot in achieving visual awareness in instrument conditions.
Another idea is reducing separation standards as part of a change to the air traffic
control paradigm. The new control paradigm would be based on either self-separation
or control by exception. In both these paradigms, power and responsibility for sep-
aration is given to the pilots. Under the current control paradigm, controllers have
the responsibility of maintaining separation. By contrast, in control by exception,
controllers will intervene to issue commands only when necessary. Some airlines be-
lieve that decreasing controller involvement decreases latency in the time to make and
issue decisions. This will allow airplanes to react more quickly to situations, thereby
enabling reduced separation. Proponents of greater pilot control acknowledge that
decision support tools are crucial to the self separation functionality. However, these
decision support tools have not been developed or, in some cases, even envisioned.
About half of the major carriers are strongly opposed to self separation. Some ar-
gue that pilots will not want to shoulder the liability that comes with maintaining
separation. Others argue that there is no reason to believe that pilots will separate
airplanes at a lower distance than controllers. The concern of the opposition stems
from experience and perceived difficulty in changing user mindset during technology
transitions.
Arrival and Departure Procedures
Arrival and departure procedures is another application with the potential to deliver
high value benefits. In particular, airlines would like to see capacity improvements
on arrival. There are several ideas for approach procedures. Many of these ideas use
required navigation performance (RNP) technology in conjunction with ADS-B to
create new arrival routes. Two arrival procedures that were cited as very high impact
are Continuous Descent Approaches (CDAs) and closely spaced parallel approaches.
CDAs are currently being tested by UPS at Louisville. Airlines like CDAs because
they offer fuel savings. CDAs are also likely to receive operational approval because
they do not require reductions in separation standards. Furthermore, airlines like
the fact that the development work is being done by another airline (UPS). Some
airlines, however, are skeptical that CDAs will provide benefits in a mixed equipage
environment. Also, some CDA procedures might require ADS-B In, which is expected
to be expensive.
Closely spaced parallel approaches would provide a high value benefit by increasing
capacity and reducing delays at several busy and constrained airports. Examples
include San Francisco (SFO), Seattle (SEA), Newark (EWR) and Boston (BOS). At
SFO, for instance, low visibility due to fog can cut the operating capacity of the
airport in half. However, closely spaced parallel approach would likely require CDTI
to aid pilot navigation. Some airlines believe ADS-B is not needed for closely spaced
parallel approaches because Precision Runway Management (PRM) procedures are
already available.
Surveillance Coverage in Non-Radar Areas
An application related to reduced separation standards is surveillance coverage in
current non-radar areas. Examples of non-radar areas include mountainous areas
(e.g. airports in Colorado) and over water areas (e.g. Gulf of Mexico and the Western
Atlantic). Because ADS-B is cheaper to install and maintain than radar, it presents
an opportunity to extend the surveillance capability of the NAS. Putting ADS-B
in current non-surveillance areas would allow operation under IFR rules instead of
procedural standards. Because the application uses existing rules, a capacity increase
can be achieved immediately with only ADS-B Out. One benefit is increased en route
throughput, since IFR allows for closer spacing of aircraft than procedural standards.
Another benefit is higher throughput at airports without radar surveillance. Increased
throughput would occur as a result of switching from one-in one-out procedures to
IFR procedures.
Although ADS-B NRA offers immediate benefits, the magnitude of the benefits
is lower than the benefits from reduced separation standards. Legacy carriers and
GA find ADS-B NRA beneficial, but regionals and low cost carriers (LCCs) do not.
This is because the regionals and LCCs interviewed tend to serve major cities and do
not usually operate in non-radar airspace. Furthermore, the economic value of remote
locations to the regional airlines interviewed is low. Regionals worry that remote areas
might not have the markets to support the increased frequency of service afforded by
capacity improvements. For the major airlines, benefits from ADS-B NRA may be
mitigated by investments in other technologies and the nature of the airspace. For
example, the state government of Colorado has invested in multilateration because
it has many mountainous airports and poor weather in the winter. Therefore, any
airlines that would reap benefits from ADS-B NRA in Colorado might receive the
same benefits sooner from multilateration. ADS-B NRA over water benefits may be
constrained by neighboring foreign air traffic control areas. For example, one airline
believes that ADS-B in the Gulf of Mexico will offer lower levels of benefits than
those claimed by the FAA because it is constrained at one end by air traffic control
in Mexico. Even if en route capacity through the Gulf were to increase, there is no
guarantee that the air traffic controllers in the terminal areas in Mexico would be
able to handle the additional traffic.
5.2.2 Secondary Benefits
Airlines mentioned several applications that could be implemented immediately be-
cause they only require ADS-B Out. However, these benefits are of lower value than
the benefits that come from applications using ADS-B In.
Secondary benefits come mostly from ground operations applications, such as
streaming ADS-B data into the Airline Operations Center (AOC). ADS-B data in
the AOC is expected to provide operational efficiency and safety improvements. For
example, airlines might be able to improve airplane turn around time at their hubs
if they had more accurate arrival information and a better view of gate and surface
activities. More accurate information would enable efficient dispatch of ground crew
and gate assignment, resulting in faster overall turn-around. Other airlines envision
being able to use the ADS-B data for push-back commands.
The locations where airlines derive surface benefits differs. Those operating at
major hubs indicated that the service would be most be useful at the large hubs,
since tend to the be system bottleneck. Airlines with more operations in remote
outputs felt the system would be more useful at the smaller airports instead of the
major airports currently with radar surveillance.
Not all airlines believe that AOC data will be beneficial. One airline contends
that there is already the capacity to offer better data, but airlines have not asked
for it, indicating the benefit offers little value. Data is currently fed into the AOC
once every twelve seconds while radar data is updated every four seconds. Others air-
lines felt that Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS)
communications were sufficient. Still other airlines have already invested heavily in
ground multilateration systems and did not see a need for ADS-B. Some airlines did
not find the application useful because they do not operate their own ground crew.
5.2.3 Benefits Locations
Figure 5-3 shows locations where ADS-B would be most beneficial to airlines.
Figure 5-3: Benefit Locations
Differences in operating structure contributed to differences in locations where
airlines would like to see benefits. For example, most LCCs and regionals interviewed
do not operate frequently in non-radar areas. Therefore, they did not find non-
radar area applications beneficial. Conversely, airlines that do not have high density
operations in busy terminal areas did not find terminal area applications to be high
value.
Terminal Areas
There is agreement amongst airlines that terminal areas are in need of capacity and
efficiency improvements. Thirteen of fourteen airlines said ADS-B would have the
biggest benefit in busy terminal areas, such as airline hubs. Airlines feel that terminal
areas are especially constrained. Metropolitan areas cited include New York, Atlanta,
Chicago, and Houston.
Non-Radar Areas
Non-radar areas were cited by seven of the fourteen carriers interviewed. In non-radar
areas, there is the potential for immediate efficiency gains with ADS-B Out because
it would enable the use of IFR procedures, as opposed to procedural standards. The
airlines that did not find benefits in non-radar surveillance areas do not operate in
that type of airspace. Within non-radar airspace, different types of airspace and dif-
ferent regions were cited by the airlines. Some airlines saw benefits at one-in one-out
airports. Other airlines cited benefits en route. Non-radar regions where surveillance
would be valuable include the mountains, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Western At-
lantic. Five of the nine major carriers also mentioned that they are equipping for
Hudson Bay in Canada.
Other than non-radar areas, airlines did not pinpoint specific en route areas where
ADS-B would be beneficial.
5.3 Costs and Barriers
Airlines identified several barriers associated with ADS-B equipage. Because the
primary concern of the airlines is getting a positive cost benefit case for equipage,
barriers tended to fall into two categories- those due to direct cost and those due to
uncertainty and risk. Figure 5-4 lists the issues of greatest concern for the airlines.
5.3.1 Costs
Cost of equipage is a large concern for most airlines. The primary costs stem from
retrofitting existing fleets, not from changing existing orders. Airlines are concerned
because many of them have old fleets that will potentially require extensive retrofits.
Many airlines cited concerns about lack of available capital for avionics investments
due to recent bankruptcies and rising operations costs due to the high cost of jet fuel.
In addition, ADS-B faces competition for investment capital from other technologies
that were on the FAA road map earlier and could provide immediate benefits, such
Figure 5-4: Barriers
as precision based navigation (RNP and RNAV). Airlines in better financial positions
are less concerned about equipage than those that are cash poor and have older fleets.
For ADS-B Out, the largest up-front costs are expected to be for navigation (GPS),
wiring changes, and additional transponders to meet D0260A standards. There is
also cost associated with ground time and installation. Training costs are not expected
to be significant for ADS-B Out.
A significant expenditure is expected for ADS-B In equipage. The displays needed
for CDTI are expected to be very expensive. It is also unclear how the data needed
for ADS-B In will be displayed.
Cost of fleet equipage will vary by airline. Airlines with relatively young fleets
are likely to already have GPS, so upgrading will be relatively inexpensive and it
will not take long to equip the entire fleet. Airlines with older and larger fleets will
need significantly more time to retrofit their fleets unless they accelerate their heavy
maintenance cycle, which would be a costly endeavor. Larger legacy carriers may also
face significants costs from needing to do GPS upgrades on their fleets.
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5.3.2 Uncertainties
Uncertainty and risk are major sources of concern for the airlines. Sources of un-
certainty and risk include the FAA's track record with technology implementation,
certification barriers, unclear information from the FAA, and difficulty in achieving
system change.
FAA Technology Implementation Record
The airlines have been unhappy with past FAA technology implementation projects,
leading to distrust of the FAA by the airlines. Airlines cited Future Air Naviga-
tion System (FANS) and Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) as
examples of technology initiatives abandoned by the FAA. Airlines were left with ex-
pensive equipment that could not be used. Experience with FANS and CPDLC has
made airlines wary of adopting technologies early for fear that investments will not
garner returns. Airlines stressed the need to see commitment to ADS-B from FAA
leadership. Airlines also want the FAA to commit to sustained funding for ADS-B
to shelter their avionics investments from political risk. One airline interviewed be-
lieves the problems with previous technology initiatives are not a legitimate source of
concern because the SBS program is being run by different people.
However, FANS and CPDLC do serve as reminders of the difficulties of achieving
system change. In particular, difficulties come from the certification process and from
changing system stakeholder mindset.
Certification Difficulties
Several airlines expressed concern about the FAA's ability to certify ADS-B avionics
and to provide operational approvals for applications that will provide real benefits,
such as reduced separation standards. The FAA does not have experience with cer-
tification and operational approvals for changes of the that is envisioned for ADS-B.
Some airlines criticized the FAA's culture of safety for creating certification require-
ments that are too conservative and stringent. In particular, required level of safety
to several nines may prove difficult without data. Airlines suggest that it may be
better not to specify to the worst case, but instead to certify to the normal case and
then find workarounds for anomalies.
Airlines are concerned that different regional offices have different standards for
operational approvals. A configuration that has been approved for one airline may
not be approved for another. This may also lead to discrepancies regarding how
procedures are developed. For example, if one airline tests certain procedures, other
airlines may not be able to use it because their specific regional office might not grant
operational approval. The overriding concern with approvals and certification barriers
is that they will increase the cost of avionics.
Human Factors Issues
Airlines are concerned about the human factors issues associated with technology
transition. In particular, they mentioned it might be difficult to change controller
mindset to accommodate and reap benefits from the new technology. Although air-
lines have not seen problems with controllers adapting to new procedures such as
those for RNP, they are concerned about resistance to new procedures and an en-
tirely new operating paradigm. Airlines that have tried to implement new procedures
at specific airports report initial hesitation from the controllers, but little resistance
after the controllers became accustomed to the new procedures. There is concern,
however, that initial push-back will impede system change.
Related to the issue of stakeholder mindset is a concern about ATC's ability to
handle mixed-equipage situations. Airlines say they are unwilling to equip early
because benefits will be diminished by a mixed-equipage environment. Some airlines
believe that the cognitive complexity of handling mixed equipage will make it difficult
to institute early adopter incentives such as preferential treatment.
Lack of Information
Another source of uncertainty for the airlines is a perceived industry-wide confu-
sion about ADS-B and lack of information from the FAA. Although some airlines
closely involved with technology development know the exact technical requirements
for ADS-B, airlines only peripherally involved with the technology complain of un-
clear technical standards. Airlines have mentioned that the NPRM has inconsistent
technical requirements. Furthermore, the requirements for ADS-B In are unclear.
One airline lambasted the ADS-B In portion of the NPRM for being more of a vision
statement than a proposed rule document. Adding further to the confusion about
technical standards is the fact that ADS-B is currently not available from the manu-
facturers. This compounds confusion about the cost of ADS-B, meaning that airlines
cannot even begin to consider making a business case or planning for equipage.
In addition to confusion about technology standards, airlines are unclear about
the FAA vision and ADS-B benefits. Airlines want to see the FAA leadership commit
to ADS-B. The fact that ADS-B has not percolated to all the FAA vision documents
contributes to the perceived lack of dedication to the program. Although it is in
the NextGen and Operation Evolution Partnership (OEP) plans from 2008, ADS-B
is not included in the FAA road map for precision based navigation. Airlines say
that constantly changing technology initiatives from the FAA make it them to justify
equipage cases to their finance departments.
Airlines are also unclear about what applications will be offered via ADS-B, com-
pounding to the difficulty of making a business case for the technology. Although
a list of applications is specified in the SBS Conops, some application descriptions
are very vague and it is not clear how they will be implemented. Furthermore, it
is difficult to quantify the benefits based upon the application descriptions in the
Conops.
5.4 Equipment Usage
Most airlines do not designate planes for specific routes domestically. One exception is
that some airlines designate planes for over-water operations. The implication is that
airlines operate interchangeable fleets. Therefore, they prefer to institute equipage
decisions for their entire fleets, instead of for specific subfleets.
For ADS-B, this means that benefits should either be available throughout the
NAS or localized in areas accessed by the majority of the fleet. Examples of localized
areas include airline hubs or a high density operations regions, such as New York.
Airline hubs and high density operations regions would theoretically provide benefits
with enough value to justify an entire fleet equipage.
Airlines report it will take between five and seven years to equip their fleets.
Most traditional carriers have a low percentage of their fleet equipped with GPS.
Figure 5-5 shows the percent of GPS equipage in fleets of major airlines, including
low cost carriers
Figure 5-5: GPS Equipage at Major Airlines
Most carriers have plans to upgrade GPS on their fleets within the next five to
ten years. LCCs and regional airlines participating in this interview tend to have a
higher number of GPS equipped aircraft, because their fleets are younger than those
of the legacy carriers.
Equipping with GPS is seen by the major airlines as method of laying the ground-
work for ADS-B equipage. Furthermore, GPS is seen as an enabler of other technolo-
gies. With the exception of Horizon Airlines, airlines are not equipping with GPS
with WAAS. However, according to the NPRM, WAAS is the only GPS system that
will meet D0260A requirements. Airlines are opposed to WAAS because they believe
that it will be expensive, it is not the global standard (since it is only available in
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the U.S.), and they believe that it is not necessary for ADS-B Out. WAAS is also
not being offered by any airplane manufacturers. By the time WAAS is needed, some
airlines hope that the Galileo system will be functioning in Europe, so the industry
can move to a global GPS augmentation standard.
NavCanada's mandate for ADS-B over Hudson Bay has pushed some airlines to
begin equipping with D0260. Of the airlines equipping with D0260, some claim to
have sufficient equipage to make D0260A essentially plug and play. Other airlines
do not know what is needed to be considered D0260A compliant. Airlines have
suggested that the FAA should give credit for D0260 equipage because that is the
European and Australian standard. In addition, they argue that D0260A is not
needed for ADS-B Out. The airlines believe the FAA should implement less stringent
equipage standards for ADS-B Out and specify requirements for ADS-B In later,
when it is deployed. This is because airlines are concerned that current technology
will be outdated by the time ADS-B In is implemented and do not want to spend
money now for technology that will not be used.
Most airplanes that operate domestically do not have Mode S ES transponders.
Those operating in Europe do have ES transponders. However, the data streams in
those airplanes may not be correct for D0260A compliance.
No airplanes are currently equipped with D0260A. Some airlines mentioned that
they have all the wiring in place for D0260A, but do not have the STC for 260A.
UPS is expecting to receive the STC for D0260A very soon.
5.5 Incentives
Figure 5-6 shows the incentives that airlines reported they would like to see with
ADS-B.
All of the airlines agreed that a mandate for ADS-B is a good idea. The airlines
do not expect much objection to the mandate because the industry views ADS-B as
inevitable. Airlines differed on the timing of the mandate. Some airlines suggested
accelerating the current mandate because it would decrease their investment risk and
Figure 5-6: Incentives
would lead to an accelerate accrual of benefits. Other airlines felt the time frame
for the current mandate was good. Airlines opposing the mandate caution that a
mandate must accommodate airline maintenance cycles. Otherwise, the mandate
could create significant disruptions to service and economic losses for airlines.
A mandate is viewed positively by many airlines because it creates a guarantee
for system-wide equipage and reduces investment risk. It also shows that the FAA is
committed to the project. Building trust amongst stakeholders is important for the
FAA because of their poor track record with previous technology implementations.
A mandate also ensures that airspace users who do not receive a positive cost-benefit
from ADS-B (such as general aviation users) will equip. One potential problem of
a mandate is that it may create difficulties in attracting early adopters, causing an
effect where, if the benefit is low, everybody waits until the last minute to equip.
Beyond a mandate, airlines suggested direct financing would incentivize them to
equip. One airlines said that if the benefits exist, monetary incentives would not
be necessary. However, airlines with larger fleets believe that the FAA should fund
implementation of ADS-B avionics out of fairness. They reason that if airplanes are
considered part of the air transportation system, then avionics should be funded with
the rest of the system. One airlines mentioned that federal funding would help them
overcome all reservations about equipage. If the FAA were to fund their equipage,
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the airline would equip, regardless of their trust in the ultimate success of the project.
Preferential treatment garnered mixed support from the airlines. Those opposed
to preferential treatment were concerned about the logistics of implementing it and
were pessimistic about its feasibility. Airlines disliked an exemption system.
One airline suggested the FAA could internalize positive externalities created by
early adopters.
5.6 Alternative Technologies
Many airlines mentioned that they were investing in technologies other than ADS-B.
These technologies compete with ADS-B avionics for airline resources. Some of these
technologies may provide benefits that overlap with ADS-B, further disincentivizing
airlines from equipage. For example, RNP may enable new arrival routes that would
ease the strain on some busy airports.
A graph of technologies in which airlines are currently investing is shown in Figure
5-7.
Figure 5-7: Alternative Technology Investments - All Carriers
It is interesting to view the breakdown of investment in alternative technologies by
air carrier type. For reference, there were a total of five legacy carriers, three LCCs,
three regionals, and two cargo carriers. All major airlines (legacy carriers and LCCs)
are investing in RNP. The airlines mentioned that RNP is a higher funding priority
than ADS-B because the technology is perceived as being more mature. In addition,
RNP will offer some benefits similar to ADS-B. It will enable more precise spacing
of airplanes, potentially opening more routes into congested airports. However, it
should be noted that RNP is only a partial solution. ADS-B will be needed for
lateral separation. In addition, PRM procedures may enable landings at airports
with closely spaced runways. If these technologies are readily available and offer a
limited version of ADS-B benefits, airlines may be less likely to adopt ADS-B early.
EFB investment comes primarily from regional carriers, which are interested in the
weather functionality. Regionals are interested in investing in EFBs because one of the
competitors in the group pioneered the use of the technology and has demonstrated
benefits from using it. Regionals may be more interested in the weather functionality
from EFBs than majors because majors already receive commercial weather services,
either through ACARS or through proprietary systems. In addition, some low cost
carriers are equipped with Live TV feeds and have been exploring the possibility of
using these feeds for weather information.
Alternative technologies mentioned by a few of the airlines include CPDLC and
multilateration. While CPDLC is lower priority than ADS-B for most airlines, it is
a priority for airlines with extensive operations in Europe, where the technology is
more mature.
Multilateration has been cited as an alternative to the surface application benefits
of ADS-B. Some airlines have invested heavily in multilateration systems at their hubs.
This detracts from the surface benefits of ADS-B. This hurts ADS-B because although
surface benefits are small, they are easy to implement. Some local governments,
such as the state of Colorado, have also been investing in multilateration systems.
The multilateration system in Colorado may impact the magnitude of non-radar area
benefit afforded by ADS-B if it is available sooner and for less of a cost to the airlines.
It is important to note that the only airline considering equipage with ADS-B In
is UPS. ADS-B In is viewed as too far in the future and the technology standards are
considered to be too uncertain to merit equipage consideration.
5.7 Synthesis/Recommendations
There was consensus on ways in which airlines would like to see improvements in the
SBS program. Many airlines mentioned they wanted to see buy-in from the FAA
leadership, particularly from the division responsible for operation procedures. Many
airlines are dissatisfied with FAA progress toward delivering operational benefits,
despite the fact the agency has concrete plans for ground infrastructure. Buy-in from
FAA leadership is key because the airlines are seeking guarantees that their equipage
investments will provide a return.
A second point pushed by airlines is the need for greater stakeholder involvement
in the ADS-B program. To engage stakeholders, it was proposed that airlines, pi-
lots, and controllers should be involved in the applications development. Airlines
also wanted more transparent information about the cost of equipage and techni-
cal standards for ADS-B. Furthermore, airlines wanted proven benefits. Trials were
suggested as a method for proving the benefits of ADS-B. The FAA has conducted
limited ADS-B trials in the Capstone program in Alaska. However, airlines want tri-
als with commercial carriers in more realistic operating environments. Airlines also
stressed the importance of making the trial data available to all users.
5.8 Conclusion
Results of the airline interviews were presented. It was found that differences in air-
line operating structures led to different perceptions of benefits, barriers, and overall
knowledge of ADS-B. Nevertheless, there was agreement on the highest value benefits
and issues of greatest concern for the airlines. The three highest benefit applications
for airlines are reduced separation standards, arrival and departure procedures, and
surveillance in non-radar areas. The highest benefit locations are terminal areas.
There was less agreement on benefits in non-radar and surface locations. Airlines are
most concerned about cost of equipage, potential certification difficulties, FAA com-
mitment to the program, and information about required equipage, costs, and bene-
fits. the regionals interviewed have a higher proportion of their fleet GPS equipped
than the majors. For incentives, all airlines support a mandate, while many also like
cash. For alternative technologies, the majors are all investing in RNP while the
regionals are all either investing in or intending to invest in EFBs.
Chapter 6
Analysis of Market Failures in
Technology Adoption
This chapter presents a game theoretic analysis of the data presented in Chapter
five (Interview Results). Free market conditions are assumed for all the games, rep-
resenting the situation of voluntary early equipage of ADS-B by the airspace users.
Market failures that occur in ADS-B implementation under free market conditions
are identified as a result of the analysis.
The four games described in Chapter three of this thesis (Market Failures Frame-
work) are played. These include three static games between: major airlines, major
airlines and other airspace users, major airlines and the FAA. A dynamic game is also
played between major airlines and the FAA.
The location of this chapter relative to the overall objective of this thesis is shown
in Figure 6-1. Insights from the analysis in this chapter will inform evaluation of
potential government policies in later chapters.
6.1 Airline to Airline Game
In the game between airlines, each agent has two choices, equip or don't equip. Each
agent has a private monetary payoff (P) and a monetary cost (C) associated with
equipage. If one agent equips but the other does not, the unequipped agent will still
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garner a benefit (e) even if they choose not to equip with ADS-B. This represents the
externalities that arise from the network effects and the public goods characteristics
of ADS-B. There is an additional benefit (y) that arises when all agents decide to
equip.
Based on the variable definitions, an airline's private benefit of equipping would
be P-C. If all airlines equip, the payoff would be an individual payoff plus a net
externality. So, in the (equip, equip) case, the net payoff would be P - C + f + y.
The externality factors are defined to always be positive (e > 0 and y > 0). The
private benefit (P-C) can either be positive or negative.
Figure 6-2 shows the 2x2 game as defined for airlines.
Assume the game is symmetric between major airlines. This means that P1 = P2,
P1-C1 +E2+Y PI-C1
P2"C2+1 I -•  El
E2 0
P2-C2 0
C1 = C2, and el = E2. A symmetry assumption is a fairly accurate representation of
payoffs because there is a high level of agreement on benefits in the airlines survey.
The assumption of symmetric costs might not be exactly accurate. The airline survey
found significant variation in airline fleet equipage, particularly in GPS equipage.
Since GPS comprises the bulk of the ADS-B Out equipage cost, this indicates costs
of equipage may vary widely from airline to airline.
Under the symmetric assumption, the game changes to the one shown in Figure
6-3.
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Figure 6-3: Symmetric Airline Game
According to the airline surveys, P-C is an unknown to many airlines and others
consider it to be negative. For the game, assume P - C < 0. Although private
benefits are negative, assume that ADS-B still benefits airlines as a group. Therefore,
P - C + E + y > 0. This game takes on the form of a coordination game, which
has two Nash equilibria - (equip, equip) and (don't equip, don't equip). The solution
(equip, equip) is Pareto dominant. However, the responses from the airline survey
indicate that, currently, airlines are more likely to select the (don't equip, don't equip)
solution. This can be seen in the airline's insistence that the benefits must justify the
costs before they will equip and that the applications currently offered by the FAA do
not deliver sufficient benefits. Although the airlines are likely to receive a net positive
value from equipping, the small private benefit of equipping makes it unlikely that
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airlines will want to equip. This is an example of a public good market failure.
Two major factors contribute to the public goods market failure. The first factor
is that the value of private benefits is too low, creating a negative cost benefit case.
This is reflected in the airline assertions that the current set of applications offered in
the SBS conops do not align with airline criteria for highest benefit applications. The
airlines would like applications that offer fuel, efficiency, and cost savings, which come
from reduced separation standards and arrival and departure procedures. The current
SBS conops applications primarily offer benefits in situational awareness and safety.
While these benefits are important, they are public goods and do not contribute to
creating positive business cases for individual airlines.
The second factor stems from the high cost of technology development faced by
early adopters. Interview data and feedback from regionals indicates that major
airlines likely to be early adopters of technologies championed by the government. The
overwhelming concern regarding certification expressed by the major carriers reflects
their role as early adopters. By contrast, none of the regionals were concerned about
certification. Because major carriers tend to be early adopters, they are likely to
incur costs from pioneering technology development in additional to simple equipage
costs. In particular, for a nascent technology like ADS-B, airlines would likely test
applications for approvals. In essence, as early adopters, major carriers are likely to
create an externality that leads to low private payoffs, creating a situation where the
non-Pareto optimal equilibrium is selected.
6.2 Airline to Other Users Game
The airline to other airspace user game is an asymmetric game. Figure 6-4 shows
the airline to other airspace user game.
In this game, in contrast to the game between major carriers, major carriers
are represented as a group, not as individual entities. Therefore PAC represents the
payoff to the large domestic carrier industry. As with the previous game, there are
externalities that arise from mixed and homogeneous equipage situations.
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Figure 6-4: Airline to Other Airspace User
Data from the airline interviews shows a skewed distribution of costs and bene-
fits between major carriers and other airspace users because the user groups value
benefits differently. The regional airlines interviewed in this study fly only to major
cities and do not spend a lot of time out of radar range. As such, they do not value
the non-radar applications as highly as major carriers. In addition, regional carriers
interviewed do not pay for gas or set their own schedules. The fuel costs and schedul-
ing responsibilities are set by the majors for which they contract. As such, regionals
do not value applications that provide fuel savings and increased airspace capacity as
highly as the majors. Applications that offer fuel savings and capacity increases may
make the regionals more competitive when bidding for contracts, but do not directly
impact their bottom line. Based on the rate of regional equipage with EFBs, it seems
that weather services might be more valuable to the regionals.
The operating structure of GA is drastically different from that of airlines. As
shown in the interviews, airlines value efficiency and fuel savings. Recreational users,
on the other hand, tend to value safety and information applications, such as weather
services. [20]
Assuming the cost of regional and major airline equipage is comparable, there is
a case of asymmetric payoffs. Because the type of benefits targeted by the ADS-B
program do not strongly appeal to the regionals interviewed, they may prefer not
equipping. In this case, only one Nash equilibrium may exist. If one agent has a
strong preference for not equipping, the only dominant solution to the problem may
be the (don't equip, don't equip) strategy.
An asymmetry in costs between majors and regionals can also be introduced to the
game. The regionals interviewed have newer airplanes that would be easier to retrofit
than the airplanes owned by the majors. In addition, as mentioned previously, majors
often absorb development costs of new technologies and procedures. As such, the cost
of equipage to regionals is likely to be lower than for the majors (CA > CGA)-
Therefore, assuming that the small payoff to regionals is balanced by the large
cost incurred by the majors (PAC - CAC ~ PGA - CGA), two Nash equilibria may
exist- either both players equip or they both do not equip. Based on the data, it
seems that neither player is particularly keen on equipping. This can be attributed to
information asymmetries, which make the non-Pareto optimal solution risk dominant.
In particular, regionals are generally less informed about a technology than the
majors. As such, the airlines do not know what types of cost-benefit cases the re-
gionals are likely to make. Therefore, uncertainty increases due to the information
asymmetry, making the don't equip decision risk dominant.
6.3 Airline to FAA Game
Two games can be played for the airline to FAA interaction. First, there is a static
game, representing the first equipage decision. An extensive form game is also played
representing the multiple equipage process proposed for ADS-B.
6.3.1 Static Game
For the static game, the airline player represents airlines as a whole. The airlines have
two decisions- equip or don't equip. The FAA also has two decisions - invest or don't
invest in ADS-B. Define FAA investment in ADS-B to mean delivery of infrastructure,
applications, and procedures. Define a payoff variable (P) and a cost variable (C) for
each player. Furthermore, because payoff represents aggregate payoffs for the airline
industry, assume that P - C > 0 for both airlines and the FAA. The condition for
positive payoff is that both airlines are equipped and the FAA has invested in ADS-B.
Assume that in the mixed solution case (don't equip, invest) and (equip, don't invest),
private payoff is zero (P = 0). For the (don't equip, don't invest) solution set, define
the benefit to be zero. This assumes future possible negative consequences from not
modernizing the air transportation system are neglected. The FAA game is shown in
Figure 6-5.
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Figure 6-5: Airline to FAA
This game has two Nash equilibria - (equip, invest) and (don't equip, don't invest).
The solution (equip, invest) Pareto dominates. However, according to the airline
survey, it is unlikely that airlines will choose the (equip, invest) solution under market
conditions. If the airlines strongly prefer the don't equip solution, the game shows
that the likely dominant equilibrium is (don't equip, don't invest).
Airlines report the (don't equip, don't invest) may dominate because of a perceived
asymmetry in costs and benefits. Airlines believe that they are generating a positive
externality for the FAA by equipping with ADS-B. The argue that the FAA would
receive cost savings by adopting ADS-B because ground stations are approximately
one-fiftieth the cost of radar stations. [15] However, the FAA contends that ADS-B
will provide airlines with operational benefits, which will result in significant cost
savings.
PATC-CATC CATC
PAC-CAC 0
0 0
-CAC 0
Data from the FAA's draft regulatory impact analysis, shown in Figure 6-6 shows
that both the FAA and airlines are correct.
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Figure 6-6: FAA Draft Impact Analysis Results [24]
The analysis shows that ADS-B will lower the cost of surveillance for both airlines
and the FAA. Based on this FAA analysis, it seems that a market failure is unlikely
to occur.
A market failure does occur because of a differences in expected time for return
on investment and airline distrust of the FAA. While both parties make significant
investments for infrastructure at the beginning of the project, they have very different
time scales for return on investment. According to the airline survey, airlines have
return on investment timeframes that vary between one and five years. Governments,
on the other hand, can afford to wait longer for a return on investment. The FAA the
estimate of benefits is based on a twenty year time frame, the lifetime of the project.
Furthermore, the FAA impact analysis expects the majority of benefits at the end
of the program, when all users are equipped and ADS-B In has been implemented.
Considered in an airline return on investment (ROI) time frame, the high initial
investments in avionics and minimal benefits in the early years of the program may
indeed create a negative business case for the airlines.
The airlines distrust that the FAA will deliver the level of benefits claimed in their
draft impact analysis. This distrust is due to a perception that the FAA has difficulty
in completing technology initiatives. Therefore, the airlines are creating a business
case on a shorter time scale and discounting the value of possible future benefits
due to distrust of the FAA. Due to different time frames used for their respective
individual business cases, there may indeed be a misalignment of costs and benefits
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for airlines and the FAA that leads to market failure. This scenario is illustrated in
Figure 6-7.
Risk Dominance
The long time frame to significant benefits makes the non-Pareto optimal solu-
tion potentially risk dominant. In particular, the condition for risk dominance is
PATCPAC - PACCATC - PATCCAc > 0. Assuming payoffs and costs and symmetric
between the FAA and air carriers as a whole, the condition for risk dominance be-
comes 2C > P. This means that the payoff would need to be at least twice the cost of
equipage in order for the Pareto optimal solution to be risk dominant. Based on air-
line feedback regarding benefits, it seems that the current set of applications offered
by the FAA is unlikely to meet that criteria. Although higher levels of benefits may
be offered in the future, those applications do not fall in the time frame necessary to
create a business case for equipage in the immediate future.
The underlying cause of system risk stems from airline uncertainty about the
FAA's ability to complete the project and deliver benefits. The uncertainty comes
from perceived institutional failures in the regulatory arm of the FAA that affects
the agency's performance as a market entity. In the case of ADS-B, one institutional
failure that adds risk to the system is organizational processes.
Organizational Process Failures
Organizational process failures for the government stem from certification, as well
as from management of system transition. Organizational process failures add risk
and decrease the value of the airline equipage case by increasing the time needed to
complete a project. With increased time to delivery of benefits, the benefits shift
beyond a reasonable timeframe for return on investment for airlines.
Management of the system transition is difficult for the government because is
has not recently implemented a change on the scale of ADS-B. The magnitude of
the system change and the voluntary equipage aspect of ADS-B makes it unique.
Previous wide-scale technology initiatives, such as TCAS, have been driven by a
strong safety argument, which justified a mandate. Voluntary equipage means that
the government must manage stakeholder needs and expectations while meeting its
own performance objectives. Furthermore, the system-wide nature of the change
means that there are many stakeholders with potentially different interests to balance.
Because change of the magnitude and type of ADS-B is so rare, the government does
not have well established standards and methods for balancing the demands of so
many stakeholders, leading to organizational process failures.
Several airlines voiced concerns regarding FAA certification and operational ap-
proval processes. In particular, airlines fear that the constraints of the approvals
process will prevent the implementation of ADS-B applications that will delivery
high value benefits. Furthermore, airlines fear that the lengthy approvals process,
coupled with the fast pace of technology development, will render technologies obso-
lete before they receive approval, creating wasted use of resources. Specific areas that
concerned the airlines included meeting safety requirements with new procedures and
avionics and receiving operational approval for individual fleet equipage. As a basis
for their concerns, airlines cited the RNAV and RNP program, which have been slow
to deliver beneficial procedures.
Analysis shows that the scope of changes envisioned for ADS-B would required
complex coordination and intensive analysis to gain approval. In particular, analysis
must be conduced in several operating performance areas, including avionics, ground
infrastructure, air to ground interface of data integration, and operational procedures.
For each operating performance area, safety analyses require technical expertise from
from several stakeholder groups, including air traffic control and airspace users. It
is noted that a large amount of analysis is required to prove systems meet perfor-
mance requirements. [23] The complexity of operational approvals indicates there is
a potential for organizational process failure.
6.3.2 Dynamic Game
The ADS-B program, as proposed by the FAA, has a minimum of two equipage
steps- one to equip for ADS-B Out and one to equip for ADS-B In. More decision
points may be added depending on whether the FAA will allow the D0260 standard,
with equipment upgrades to D0260A for ADS-B In, and further equipment upgrades
accommodate new capabilities. A dynamic game can be used to simulate multiple
step equipages.
An extensive form game demonstrates why airlines are opposed to a multiple
step equipage. Figure 6-8 shows a dynamic game between the FAA and airlines
represented in extensive form.
Each node represents either an equipage decision point for the airlines or an in-
vestment decision point for the FAA. The game assumes four decision points- two
by the airlines and two by the FAA. The FAA's first decision would represent their
initial ground infrastructure deployment and first group of applications. The airline's
first decision represents equipage with ADS-B Out. The FAA's second decision point
represents implementation of ADS-B In applications. The airline's second decision
represents a second equipage for ADS-B In. At each decision point, there is a prob-
ability that the user will choose to not equip or invest, thereby ending the program.
Assume airlines will choose to equip with probability a. Assume the FAA will choose
to invest with probability 0. The probabilities of equipage and investment represent
the coordination effort required at each decision point. Each coordination effort is
analogous to playing the static games shown above. Payoffs are shown at the termi-
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Figure 6-8: Dynamic Game: FAA v. Airlines
nus of branches of the tree. Full benefits cannot be achieved unless the full chain of
positive investment and equipage decisions is followed.
The multiple step game shows that multiple equipages add risk and uncertainty to
the system because probabilities associated with choices at each step are multiplica-
tive. Because probabilities are less than one, the chances of achieving the optimal end
state diminish with every additional branch in the decision tree. Initial investment
risk is compounded at decision points because airlines are not certain that the final
goal will be attained. Therefore, multiple decision points make it less likely airlines
will make the significant up-front investment necessary to equip with ADS-B.
The risk at each decision point is particularly significant when considering the
FAA is tied to a regulatory body that is also subject to institutional failures. An
institutional failure likely to occur in the multiple step decision game is bureaucratic
interests and politics.
In particular, sustained funding and government support for ADS-B is a signifi-
cant concern of airlines. Airlines cite failures of technology initiatives such as CPDLC
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as a basis for their worries. Research of multinational infrastructure programs has
validated airline concerns, showing the fragility of government funding for infrastruc-
ture type projects. Rogoff has shown in game theoretic analysis that when pressured
with an election cycle, governments will choose to allocate resources to projects that
can produce immediate results in order to win votes rather than to long term in-
frastructure projects. [31] Even discounting the effect of election cycles, sustained
government funding is difficult to achieve in the face of competing interests, such as
health care and education. The long time of an infrastructure project exposes it to
greater risk of failure.
There is significant airline concern over the risk of program failure presented by
funding cycles. The concern can be seen in airline responses that called for buy-in
from FAA leadership and change being driven from the top. The sentiment amongst
airlines is that having leadership champion the program will provide more stability
and certainty for sustained funding. Some airlines suggested the FAA should accel-
erate the mandate for ADS-B, provided the benefits exist. Accelerating the mandate
would decrease the risk of project failure because it would provide fewer funding
decision points at which the project could fail.
6.4 Conclusion
Through a game theoretic analysis of airline interview data, several market failures
were shown to exist for ADS-B technology implementation under free market condi-
tions. Between major airlines, there is likely to be a public goods failure, where the
individual benefit from equipage does not justify the cost. This can be attributed
to the nature of applications offered by the current SBS Conops and the time frame
during which airlines seek a return on investment. Between major airlines and other
airspace users, there is likely to be a market failure resulting from asymmetry of costs
and benefits and asymmetry of information. Asymmetries in costs and benefits come
from different roles that the airspace users play in technology adoption, with the
legacy carriers traditionally as early adopters and the regionals traditionally as late
adopters. Between the airlines and the FAA, there is also a perceived asymmetry of
costs and benefits, which stems from differences in acceptable time frames for return
on investment. In addition, a market failure is likely to occur due to risk dominance.
Risk in the system comes from institutional failures in organizational processes at
the FAA regulatory arm. In addition, for a dynamic game, risk naturally arises from
multiple equipage decision steps.
Chapter 7
Policies
Market failures suggest a need for government intervention. In theory, the role of
government is to correct market failures, creating conditions that will drive the market
to an efficient equilibrium. In this chapter, potential government actions to correct
ADS-B market failures are suggested and evaluated. However, as shown in Chapter
six (Analysis of Market Failures in Technology Adoption), government intervention
may not always be effective because government is subject to institutional failures.
The location of this chapter relative to the overall objective of this thesis is shown
in Figure 7-1.
Game Theory %Airline Analysis
Interview Data /
Policy
Literature Review Anal sisions
KI
Market
Failure -
" Framework , = Process Flow
S-f - Data Flow
Figure 7-1: Thesis Map
7.1 Policy Mechanisms
A framework for studying government mechanisms pertaining to air transportation
was developed by Marais and Weigel (2006). Government actions are grouped into
four categories, which include infrastructure development support, increasing tech-
nology value, positive incentives, and mandates or putative measures. [21] Based on
the feedback from the airline interviews, for ADS-B, it may be appropriate to sep-
arate mandates from putative measures, resulting in five categories of government
mechanisms. The mechanisms are shown in Figure 7-2.
* S,u, U,
*C a,(U SF
.r i
o o5
0B.Infasrucur Deelpmn
and Support
Figure 7-2: Mechanisms for Technology Transition [21]
Infrastructure development means ensuring that the technology is available and
accessible to users. It includes physical deployment of ground infrastructure, certifi-
cation, and development and testing of new procedures. For ADS-B, infrastructure
would include ground stations, ATC controller interfaces, applications and proce-
dures.
There are three ways to increase technology value. The public goods benefits can
be increased, leading to an increased technology value across the system. Or, the
private goods benefits of the technology can be increased, creating higher benefits
for each individual user. In addition, the timeframe to accrual of benefit can be
decreased, creating benefits within an acceptable time for return on investment for
the airlines.
Positive incentives are tools available to the government that can be used to mod-
ulate the value of a technology. These tools offer benefits beyond the scope of benefits
that can be provided by technology alone. Positive incentives can be used to deliver
benefits in a return on investment timeframe acceptable for airline business cases
if applications development takes too long. For ADS-B, positive benefits that have
been suggested include cash payments to airlines, loans, tax credits, and preferential
treatment measures.
Mandates are a way of guaranteeing full equipage and reducing investment risk.
Mandates include rules requiring equipage of ADS-B. Mandates can be applied to
either to the entire airspace or just to specific airspaces. For example, the FAA can
choose to require ADS-B into all class B airspace, which would force most airlines
into compliance. By decreasing risk, mandates may shift the airline cost benefit case
to show returns within an acceptable time period.
Putative measures are a way to tax noncompliance. Putative measures can also
include taxes for non-compliance, or exclusionary airspace restrictions. Putative mea-
sures can be used to shift the cost-benefit analysis for airlines by increasing the cost
of noncompliance to an unacceptable level. It is interesting to note that putative
measures and positive incentives acts in opposite ways. Positive incentives induce
users to equip by adding benefit while putative measures induce users to equip to by
increasing the cost of non-compliance.
The FAA has already implemented several policies that align with the Marais-
Weigel framework. The FAA began infrastructure development through the contract
for ground station deployment, awarded to ITT in August of 2007. Ground infras-
tructure deployment is expected to begin in 2010 and finish by 2014. In addition, the
FAA has taken steps toward a mandate for ADS-B out by issuing a NPRM in August
of 2007. According to the NPRM, a mandate for ADS-B Out in the NAS will take
effect in 2020. The FAA has sought to increase technology value to GA users with
a UAT link decision. Because GA find weather and information services most valu-
able, these services will be provided on through UAT. However, the ultimate value of
the FIS-B services is debatable because of the development of alternative commercial
services, such as XM radio.
Despite the actions of the FAA, data from the airlines shows the system is still
prone to market failures. This suggests the FAA should take further steps to cor-
rect these sources of market failure. This conclusion is validated by airline survey
data, which indicates airlines believe the FAA has not done enough to advance the
deployment of ADS-B technology.
7.2 Policy Selection Criteria
The market failures identified in Chapter six present criteria for objectives of govern-
ment policy. The market failures identified include:
* Public Goods Failure
* Asymmetry of Costs and Benefits
* Asymmetry of Information
* Risk Dominance
* Organizational Process Failures
* Bureaucratic Interests and Politics
To correct the public goods failure, the government could ensure delivery of private
benefits. Although it is important that the government deliver the public goods
offered by ADS-B, private benefits can be used as a vehicle for encouraging airspace
user equipage and attaining implementation of the public goods. Through careful
selection of benefits and incentives, the government can realign asymmetries of costs
and benefits. Asymmetry of information can be corrected by encouraging stakeholder
involvement and working to effectively disseminate information. Risk can be reduced
by correcting information asymmetries and institutional failures.
7.3 Policy Actions
In the synthesis portion of the interviews, airlines suggested several policy actions
that would encourage them to equip. These are categorized according to the modified
Marais-Weigel framework.
Although the FAA has begun infrastructure development with ground infrastruc-
ture deployment and initial applications and procedures development, they can ex-
tend their use of this mechanism through flight trials. Airlines believe that trials
are necessary to demonstrate the real benefits of ADS-B applications and to ensure
safety and certification approval for the applications and procedures. Several air-
lines have expressed eagerness to collaborate with the FAA on ADS-B trials. To a
limited extend, the FAA begun trials of ADS-B, focusing their work in Alaska and
Louisville. The Alaska trials were part of the Capstone program. However, the trials
only demonstrated ADS-B via UAT, so the scope of the study only applies to GA
aircraft. In addition, airlines feel the data from the Capstone trials is not transparent
and accessible. Therefore, the results cannot be independently validated. Trials with
UPS in Louisville demonstrating CDA procedures have been more effective. Airlines
laud the achievements of these trials and they have been effective in providing proof
of ADS-B benefits and garnering support for the program. Airlines would like to see
this type of trial program expanded to more applications.
To increase technology value, airline interview data shows the best action may
be to deliver benefits with high private value. Applications with high private value
to the airlines can be accelerated through the development and approval process.
Examples of high benefit applications for the airlines are ADS-B in non-radar areas,
arrival and departure procedures, and allowing reduced separation standards. The
FAA has already tried to increase technology value for general aviation users by
offering weather and information services through the FIS-B link. However, with the
emergence of satellite weather services, it is unclear if FIS-B services will provides as
much of a benefit as previously calculated.
There many ways to offer positive incentives, including direct financing (cash),
tax credits, and preferential treatment. Of these incentives, airlines preferred direct
financing. Some airlines liked preferential treatment, while others did not feel that
it would be feasible. Another potential positive incentive is guaranteeing benefits to
the airlines by a certain date. If the FAA is unable to deliver benefits by a certain
date, they could offer to pay for lost benefits. This would insure the airlines against
institutional failures.
The FAA already has a mandate for ADS-B Out. Airlines like the mandate
because it provides insurance for their investment decisions and standardizes the
technology. However, airlines suggested considering alternative instantiations of the
mandate. To encourage early equipage amongst a particular group of airspace users,
the FAA could impose a mandate in select airspace, such as the airspace around New
York, or around class B airports. Some airlines suggested the FAA could accelerate
the mandate for ADS-B Out for airlines. A decrease in the program cycle length
would decrease investment risk for the airlines. Lastly, some airlines suggested a need
for a mandate for ADS-B In.
Putative measures include taxation and exclusionary airspace. Taxation would
tax anybody who is not equipped. Exclusionary airspace is the inverse of preferential
treatment. It would not allow anybody not equipped to enter certain airspace. Before
putative measures are levied, the reason for stakeholder non-compliance should be
considered. Some airspace users, particularly recreational GA, may be unwilling to
equip because they cannot afford to do so. In such a case, putative measures would
unfairly inflict a double tax on these users. One particularly innovative program
employed by AirServices Australia uses the ATC services savings from ADS-B to
fund GA equipage. While the airlines do not reap financial benefits from the savings,
they benefit indirectly from having a higher percentage of equipped planes in the
airspace.
7.4 Policy Evaluation
Figure 7-3 shows a summary of the policy options, evaluated against the policy
selection criteria.
As seen in Figure 7-3, no single measure sufficiently satisfies all the policy selection
criteria. Instead, a combination of policies will likely be adopted to achieve the goals of
the FAA and meet the criterion of the stakeholders. The wide variety of stakeholders
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does not make this a trivial problem. One way to package policies is by program
phase. Survey results show that different stakeholders are likely to equip at different
phases of the program. In essence, each stakeholder group reacts to a slightly different
set of market conditions.
According to the surveys, major domestic carriers are likely to be the earliest
adopters. Once the technology has become more mature, regionals, business jets, and
other GA aircraft who can afford to equip are likely to equip. Recreational general
aviation users are likely to be the last to equip due to a lack of benefits and inability
to afford new the new technology.
Amongst early adopters, the market failures were public goods failures and cost-
benefit asymmetries due to short timeframes for airline ROI. The failures arise due
to externalities from pioneering development costs, a long technology deployment
time, and higher risk of program failure. Policies such as preferential treatment,
offering high private benefits, and financing would likely encourage early adoption.
Preferential treatment and financing serve to internalize externalities produced by the
early adopters. High private benefits helps the airlines make a positive cost-benefit
case for equipage.
Two types of early adopters seem to exist for ADS-B. One type of early adopter
is airlines that would equip if they could accumulate benefits from existing equipage
and technologies. This type of early adopter plays a key role in moving industry
momentum toward the new technology. Therefore, they are strategically important
for the FAA. For type one early adopter airlines, it is important to accelerate benefits.
To accelerate benefits to early adopters, it may be beneficial to first find appli-
cations that offer private benefits using existing technology. For example, the FAA
could find applications that use ADS-B in conjunction with RNP or D0260 to provide
benefits. Existing technologies offer the advantage of having already gone through
the certification process. When thinking about benefits for early adopters, it is im-
portant that the benefits are independent, to allay fears about the impact of a mixed
equipage environment.
A second type of early adopter is airlines willing to invest in future concepts.
They are extremely useful to the FAA because they present an opportunity for the
FAA to conduct trials of new avionics, such as D0260A, and to test new procedures.
Because development work in future concepts requires heavy investment and the
airlines produce significant positive externalities, it is important that the FAA help
them internalize these externalities. Potential actions for the FAA include financing
equipage and offering preferential treatment.
For later adopters, market failures that arise are information asymmetries and
cost-benefit asymmetries stemming from a lack of benefits. These market failures
stem from the fact that late adopters may have a relative paucity of resources and
the program does not offer them private benefits. If the goal is to encourage late
adopters to equip earlier, it may be beneficial to provide information and accelerate
applications that will provide high benefit to them. Conducting trials to prove benefits
may help them establish a more compelling individual cost-benefit cases. These trials
will likely follow naturally from early adopters equipage. As a last resort, putative
measures and mandates may be appropriate. However, these measures should be
instituted cautiously because they may act as a double tax for users who could not
afford to equip in the first place. For a small subset of late adopters who cannot
accord to equip (i.e. likely some recreational GA owners), direct financing might be
appropriate.
Meeting the benefits demands of all stakeholder groups will be challenging. How-
ever, overlaps in preferred benefits amongst stakeholder groups provides opportunities
for government action. For example, all types of airlines are interested in benefits that
alleviate congestion in busy terminal areas. Non-radar areas provide an opportunity
to provide benefits to both GA and legacy carriers.
In addition to targeted policies, some policies would be beneficial for the duration
of the program. These policies are targeted at market failures that affect many stake-
holder groups. Examples of these market failures are risk and institutional failures.
Risk can be reduced throughout the program by getting support from FAA leadership
and eliminating organizational processes failures.
All stakeholder groups were also concerned about a potential lack of benefits from
ADS-B. This suggests a need for user-driven development of benefits. The data
presented in this thesis offer a starting point for thinking about applications designed
to offer high user benefit. As the program progresses, the users suggest that the FAA
should provide them with data from technology trials and offer a transparent process
for the users to offer input and suggestions.
7.5 Implementation Difficulties
Policy selection is only part of the work. There may be tremendous difficulty in im-
plementing some of the policies suggested in this chapter due to institutional failures.
In particular, institutional failures may inhibit the government's ability to act as a
coordinating body through the reallocation of resources.
One example is airline skepticism about the FAA's ability to offer early adopter
incentives. The airlines reason that if the incentives offered are truly valuable, lobby-
ing groups will ensure the benefits are available to all users, regardless of equipage.
Lobbying is an example of a bureaucratic interest and politics institutional failure.
Lobbyists makes it difficult for the FAA to shift benefits from one user group to an-
other. They also make it difficult for the FAA to offer incentives that apply only to a
subset of stakeholders, such as incentives for early adopters. A potential way around
this failure is making the stakeholders understand the reasoning for the action and
creating an atmosphere of perceived fairness, as Airservices Australia did for their
general aviation equipage plan.
The FAA may also be limited in its ability to partner with airlines for trials of
technology under development and future airspace concepts. In particular, they may
be accused of favoritism for partnering with specific airlines. One airline suggested
that a way around this problem is for the FAA to solicit information about poten-
tial early adopters through the Air Transport Association, the airline industry trade
group.
7.6 Conclusion
Government policies for correcting market failures are presented and evaluated. The
Marais-Weigel framework is used to categorize government actions. Potential policies
were evaluated for their ability to correct market failures. It is suggested that a
combination of policies be adopted, depending upon the phase of the program and
the airspace user's resources and needs. Implementation difficulties associated with
some suggested policies are discussed.

Chapter 8
Conclusion
This thesis presented an analysis of the problem of market driven technology tran-
sition in the air transportation system, focusing specifically on ADS-B. Technology
transition problems arise because of the network characteristics of ADS-B, which
make it prone to market failure. A market failure framework was used to identify
potential sources of problems in ADS-B technology implementation. Market failures
were illustrated using game theoretic analysis. Data for the analyses was collected
through a series of airline interviews. Policy actions were evaluated for their ability
to correct market failures.
8.1 Summary of Results
Fourteen airlines were interviewed to gather data on airline views of ADS-B costs and
benefits, airline perception of ADS-B, and airline investment decisions. For benefits,
airlines are primarily interested in applications that provide efficiency improvements,
fuel savings, and increase airspace capacity. Benefits that provide high value to
airspace users include reduced separation standards, arrival and departure procedures,
and surveillance in current non-radar areas. Barriers identified by airlines fall into two
categories - cost and uncertainty. Costs are associated with cost of equipage. GPS is
expected to account for a large proportion of the cost for ADS-B Out. Uncertainties
are associated with institutional failures that result from the FAA role as both a
regulatory and market agent. Uncertainties serve to increase investment risk for
airlines.
It was found that different types of airspace users have different preferences and
priorities. This could make it difficult to deliver equal benefits to all stakeholders.
Regional airlines participating in this study have a higher percentage of fleet GPS
equipage than legacy airlines, indicating it may be easier for regionals to implement
ADS-B. However, regionals are likely to act as late adopters while major carriers are
likely to act as early adopters. This is because regionals do not pay for their own fuel
or set their own schedule, resulting in less emphasis on the types of benefits offered
by ADS-B.
Market failures identified to occur for the ADS-B technology implementation un-
der market conditions include:
* Public Goods Failure due to low private benefits in the current set of pro-
posed ADS-B applications.
* Asymmetry of Costs and Benefits due to differences in stakeholder prefer-
ences.
* Asymmetry of Information due to different levels of stakeholder knowledge
and access to information regarding ADS-B.
* Risk Dominance resulting from difficulties in certification and perceived past
problems with technology implementations.
* Organizational Process Failures which make it difficult to fit existing proce-
dures to evolving situations, such as accommodating the level of changes needed
to approve ADS-B avionics and procedures.
* Bureaucratic Interests and Politics which can inhibit government from
making a sustained commitment to the project and taking necessary actions to
correct market failures.
Government intervention can be effective in correcting market failures. Govern-
ment policies can work through many mechanisms, including infrastructure develop-
ment and support, increasing technology value, offering positive incentives, issuing
mandates, or levying putative measures. It is suggested that governments should
adopt a combination of policies and vary them according to the phase of the project.
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In particular, it is important for the government to deliver private benefits, balance
costs and benefits to stakeholders, give stakeholders more information, and correct
institutional failures. Private benefits incentivize users to equip and provide a vehicle
for ensuring the delivery of public benefits. For early adopters, the government should
focus on internalizing externalities. For late adopters, the government should focus
on delivering information and insuring they have the resources to equip. A mandate
was considered a good idea by all airlines.
8.2 Contributions
This thesis presents two types of contributions. First, a method for analyzing poten-
tial problems in air transportation technology initiatives is presented. The method
applies economic ideas of market failure and game theoretic analysis to analyzing
stakeholder interactions in air transportation. In this thesis, the method is used for
the case of ADS-B technology adoption.
The second contribution of this thesis is a body of knowledge regarding domes-
tic airline views on ADS-B technology in particular and equipage investments in
general. This knowledge will potentially be useful for government agencies thinking
about technology transition in the future. By using the method presented to analyze
the ADS-B program implementation, this thesis bridges the gap between technology
adoption theory and the practice of implementing infrastructure technologies in air
transportation.
8.3 Future Work
Specific to ADS-B, a rigorous analysis of policy options presented in this thesis should
be conducted to provide further guidance for government actions. Furthermore, as
data regarding costs, benefits, and risk, becomes available, the game theoretic analysis
of market failures can be refined. It may be necessary to do further analyses for ADS-
B In equipage or if conditions changes in the ADS-B project.
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The methods and ideas used in this thesis can be used to analyze other coordi-
nation problems in air transportation that present network features. In addition, it
would be interesting to extend the application of the method to other problems with
similar characteristics.
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Appendix A
Interview Instrument
ADS-B Airline Industry Survey
Professor John Hansman, Professor Annalisa Weigel, (Jenny) Xiaojie Hu
MIT International Center for Air Transportation (ICAT)
Carrier Name:
Interviewee: Date:
The MIT International Center for Air Transportation, in the Department of Aero-
nautics and Astronautics, is working with the FAA to investigate applications and
benefits of ADS-B technology and user equipage. This data will be valuable in inform-
ing strategies for the deployment of ADS-B ground infrastructure and applications.
We are surveying airlines to identify their views on benefits from ADS-B applica-
tions and costs and barriers associated with adoption of ADS-B. Thanks for your
participation.
For the purposes of this survey, ADS-B services are divided into two types - 1) Surveil-
lance and 2) Broadcast services. Broadcast services refer to TIS-B and FIS-B. Surveil-
lance services refer to all other ADS-B functionalities on both 1090 and UAT.
Part I. Background:
1.1 What is your role in your airline?
1.2 In what capacity have you been involved in ADS-B?
1.3 What is your airline's view of ADS-B?
1.4 What is your airline's view of the NPRM for ADS-B Out?
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Part II. Benefits Questions:
We are considering ways to deploy the ADS-B infrastructure and would like feedback
on applications and geographies for the rollout plan. Infrastructure can be rolled out
in three types of service volumes: 1) Surface, 2) Terminal, and 3) Enroute. The
surface service volume refers to the airport traffic area and surface. The terminal
service volume is equivalent to a TRACON. The enroute service volume is equivalent
to an ARTCC.
ADS-B information can be linked to three locations: the air traffic control center, the
airline operations center, and airplane cockpits.
2.1 Surveillance services: For your airline, what benefits/applications can be derived
from linking ADS-B surveillance data to the following locations. Please consider
benefits associated with surface, terminal, enroute, and non-radar coverage airspaces.
a) ATC
b) Airline operations centers
c) Airplane cockpits
d) Other
Are there specific locations where these benefits apply?
Are there locations where it would be beneficial to install ADS-B ground stations
early in the rollout process? Which locations? Why?
2.2 Broadcast services: Do you think there are any broadcast services that provide
benefits your airline? (i.e. graphical weather information, NOTAMS, ect.)
Yes No
If yes, what benefits?
Are there specific locations where the benefits apply?
2.3 How do the equipage decisions of other airlines or users influence your decision to
equip with ADS-B?
2.4 At the national level, what do you see as the main obstacles for obtaining the
ADS-B applications you mentioned?
2.5 Are the benefits/applications you have mentioned enough to incentivize your
airline to equip with ADS-B? Why or why not?
Part III. Costs and Barriers
3.1 For your airline, what do you see as the main barriers or concerns regarding the
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adoption of ADS-B? How do these costs and barriers compare in the way that they
influence your decision to equip with ADS-B?
3.2 What is your confidence that the benefits/applications you mentioned in Part II
for ADS-B will receive operational approval by the FAA?
3.3 What incentives, or mandates beyond operational benefits would be most effective
in encouraging your fleet to equip?
Part IV. Current Status
4.1 What is your airline's philosophy towards fleet operation? (i.e. Do you operate
separate fleets for certain routes?)
4.2 What level and type of ADS-B equipment is on your current fleet? How much of
your fleet is GPS equipped?
4.3 Are your new aircraft delivered with ADS-B?
Yes No
What level of ADS-B equipage do they have? (i.e. DO 260 v. D0260A)
4.4 What type of equipment upgrades would be needed to make your fleet NPRM
(for ADS-B Out) compliant? (i.e. DO260A, GPS with WAAS, TSO-C166a)
Part V. Future Plans
5.1 The NPRM suggests a mandate for ADS-B Out only. Does your airline have plans
to equip with ADS-B In? Why or why not?
5.2 Is your airline planning any other modernization efforts? (i.e. RNP, CPDLC,
etc.) What is the relative priority of these technologies compared with ADS-B ?
Part VI. Synthesis
6.1 Have you been involved with other modernization efforts?
Yes No
What lessons learned from those experiences can be applied to ADS-B?
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